

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)	
ISSA ALI ABDULLAH AL MURBATI,)	
<i>et al.</i>)	
)	
Petitioners,)	
)	
v.)	Civil Action No. 04-CV-1227 (RBW)
)	
GEORGE W. BUSH,)	
President of the United States, <i>et al.</i> ,)	
Respondents.)	
)	
)	
)	

DECLARATION OF JAMES R. CRISFIELD JR.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Commander James R. Crisfield Jr., Judge Advocate General’s Corps, United States Navy, hereby state that to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, the following is true, accurate and correct:


1. I am the Legal Advisor to the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. In that capacity I am the principal legal advisor to the Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals, and provide advice to Tribunals on legal, evidentiary, procedural, and other matters. I also review the record of proceedings in each Tribunal for legal sufficiency in accordance with standards prescribed in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal establishment order and implementing directive.

2. I hereby certify that the documents attached hereto constitute a true and accurate copy of the portions of the record of proceedings before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal related to petitioner Issa Ali Abdullah Al Murbati that are suitable for public release. The portions of the record that are classified or considered law enforcement sensitive are not attached

hereto. I have redacted information that would personally identify certain U.S. Government personnel in order to protect the personal security of those individuals. I have also redacted internee serial numbers because certain combinations of internee serial numbers with other information become classified under applicable classification guidance.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: 12 Oct 04



James R. Crisfield Jr.
CDR, JAGC, USN



**Department of Defense
Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals**

OARDEC/Ser: 0202
11 October 2004

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Subj: **REVIEW OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL FOR
DETAINEE ISN # [REDACTED]**

Ref: (a) Deputy Secretary of Defense Order of 7 July 2004
(b) Secretary of the Navy Order of 29 July 2004

1. I concur in the decision of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal that Detainee ISN # [REDACTED] meets the criteria for designation as an Enemy Combatant, in accordance with references (a) and (b).

2. This case is now considered final, and the detainee will be scheduled for an Administrative Review Board.

J. M. McGARRAH
RADM, CEC, USN

Distribution:
NSC (Mr. John Bellinger)
DoS (Ambassador Prosper)
DASD-DA
JCS (J5)
SOUTHCOM (CoS)
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OARDEC (Fwd)
CITF Ft Belvoir

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9 Oct 04

MEMORANDUM

From: Legal Advisor

To: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Subj: LEGAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL
FOR DETAINEE ISN # [REDACTED]Ref: (a) Deputy Secretary of Defense Order of 7 July 2004
(b) Secretary of the Navy Implementation Directive of 29 July 2004Encl: (1) Appointing Order for Tribunal #8 of 13 September 2004
(2) Record of Tribunal Proceedings

1. Legal sufficiency review has been completed on the subject Combatant Status Review Tribunal in accordance with references (a) and (b). After reviewing the record of the Tribunal, I find that:

a. The detainee was properly notified of the Tribunal process and affirmatively declined to participate in the Tribunal proceedings.

b. The Tribunal was properly convened and constituted by enclosure (1).

c. The Tribunal complied with all provisions of references (a) and (b). Note that some information in exhibit R-7 was redacted. The FBI properly certified in exhibit R-2 that the redacted information would not support a determination that the detainee is not an enemy combatant. Note also that the Tribunal's reference to "Exhibit R-11" in paragraph 1(g) of enclosure (2) to their Decision Report appears to be a typo. The Tribunal was more likely referring to exhibit R-10


d. The detainee made no requests for witnesses or other evidence.

e. The Tribunal's decision that detainee # [REDACTED] is properly classified as an enemy combatant was unanimous.

f. The detainee's Personal Representative was given the opportunity to review the record of proceedings. He declined to submit comments to the Tribunal.

2. The proceedings and decision of the Tribunal are legally sufficient and no corrective action is required.

3. I recommend that the decision of the Tribunal be approved and the case be considered final.



JAMES R. CRISTFIELD JR.
CDR, JAGC, USN



Department of Defense
Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals

13 Sep 04

From: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals

Subj: APPOINTMENT OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL #8

Ref: (a) Convening Authority Appointment Letter of 9 July 2004

By the authority given to me in reference (a), a Combatant Status Review Tribunal established by "Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba" dated 29 July 2004 is hereby convened. It shall hear such cases as shall be brought before it without further action of referral or otherwise.

The following commissioned officers shall serve as members of the Tribunal:

MEMBERS:

[REDACTED], Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve; President

[REDACTED], Colonel, U.S. Army; Member

[REDACTED], Lieutenant Colonel, JAGC, U.S. Army; Member
(JAG)

J. M. McGARRAH
Rear Admiral
Civil Engineer Corps
United States Naval Reserve



HEADQUARTERS, OARDEC FORWARD
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360

1 October 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CSRT

FROM: OARDEC FORWARD Commander

SUBJECT: CSRT Record of Proceedings ICO ISN# [REDACTED]

1. Pursuant to Enclosure (1), paragraph (I)(5) of the *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba* dated 29 July 2004, I am forwarding the Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report for the above mentioned ISN for review and action.

2. If there are any questions regarding this package, point of contact on this matter is the undersigned at DSN 660-3088.


DAVID L. TAYLOR
Colonel, USAF

(U) Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report Cover Sheet

(U) This Document is UNCLASSIFIED Upon Removal of Enclosures (2) and (4).


(U) TRIBUNAL PANEL: #8

(U) ISN#: [REDACTED]

Ref: (a) (U) Convening Order for Tribunal #8 of 13 September 2004] (U)
(b) (U) CSRT Implementation Directive of 29 July 2004 (U)
(c) (U) DEPSECDEF Memo of 7 July 2004 (U)

Encl: (1) (U) Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision (U)
(2) (U) Classified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision (S/NF)
(3) (U) Summary of Detainee/Witness Testimony (U/FOUO) - NA
(4) (U) Copies of Documentary Evidence Presented (S/NF)
(5) (U) Personal Representative's Record Review (U)

1. (U) This Tribunal was convened on 27 September 2004 by references (a) and (b) to make a determination as to whether the detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant as defined in reference (c).
2. (U) On 27 September 2004 the Tribunal determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Detainee [REDACTED] is properly designated as an enemy combatant as defined in reference (c).
3. (U) In particular, the Tribunal finds that this detainee is a member of, affiliated with, al Qaida, as more fully discussed in the enclosures.
4. (U) Enclosure (1) provides an unclassified account of the basis for the Tribunal's decision. A detailed account of the evidence considered by the Tribunal and its findings of fact are contained in enclosures (1) and (2).



Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Tribunal President

**UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF BASIS FOR TRIBUNAL
DECISION**

(Enclosure (1) to Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report)

TRIBUNAL PANEL: _____ #8

ISN #: _____ 

1. Introduction

As the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Decision Report indicates, the Tribunal has determined that this detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant and is a member of, or affiliated with, al Qaida. In reaching its conclusions, the Tribunal considered both classified and unclassified information. The following is an account of the unclassified evidence considered by the Tribunal and other pertinent information. Classified evidence considered by the Tribunal is discussed in Enclosure (2) to the CSRT Decision Report.

2. Synopsis of Proceedings

The unclassified evidence presented to the Tribunal by the Recorder indicated that the Detainee voluntarily traveled from Bahrain to Afghanistan on 2 November 2001. The Detainee traveled to Afghanistan via Pakistan to fight the Jihad, to make himself a better person, and to have a 15,000 Dinar debt forgiven. Since he did not know how to use a Kalishnikov rifle, the Detainee went to Kandahar to find training. The Kandahar camp had been closed so he went on to Kabul, Afghanistan to find training. The Detainee was injured by a grenade while traveling to Khost, Afghanistan. The Detainee was affiliated with Abu Sayyef. During the interview process, the Detainee worked on a written statement. However, prior to the last interview, the Detainee received a letter from his attorney that told him not to talk to the military personnel without the attorney being present. The Personal Representative asked the Detainee if he wanted his already prepared written statement to be submitted and the Detainee didn't object. The Detainee however, chose not to sign the statement or attest to its accuracy. The Detainee called no witnesses and requested no unclassified or classified documents be produced.

3. Evidence Considered by the Tribunal

The Tribunal considered the following evidence in reaching its conclusions:

- a. Exhibits: D-a through D-c and R-1 through R-13.
- b. Testimony of the following persons: None
- c. Written, unsigned statement from the Detainee.

4. Rulings by the Tribunal on Detainee Requests for Evidence or Witnesses

The Detainee requested no witnesses and requested no additional evidence be produced; therefore, no rulings on these matters were required

5. Discussion of Unclassified Evidence

The Tribunal considered the following unclassified evidence in making its determinations:

a. The recorder offered Exhibits R-1 through R-3 into evidence during the unclassified portion of the proceeding. Exhibit R-1 is the Unclassified Summary of Evidence. While this summary is helpful in that it provides a broad outline of what the Tribunal can expect to see, it is not persuasive in that it provides conclusory statements without supporting unclassified evidence. Exhibit R-2 provided no usable evidence. Accordingly, the Tribunal had to look to classified exhibits for support of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence. Exhibit R-3 was the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide that provided information on the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

b. Essentially the only unclassified evidence the Tribunal had to consider was the detainee's unsigned written statement as taken by the Personal Representative. In sum, the Detainee's written statement indicates that he traveled to Pakistan for medical treatment. His passport (Exhibit D-c) contains a medical visa, issued on 28 October 2001 that was good for one month. According to the Detainee's statement, he entered Pakistan and was immediately arrested by the Pakistan police. The Pakistan police physically abused him and then questioned him. The Detainee was provided a copy of a written statement for him to sign, which he signed without reading it. While in Pakistani custody, he heard a loud explosion and he awoke in a hospital. The Detainee was told that a bomb had exploded. The Detainee alleges that he had told two different stories about his injuries because he was afraid. The first story of being injured in a bus accident in Khost, Afghanistan was false. Additionally, the Detainee states that while he traveled to the Philippines, he did so for recreational purposes only. The passport indicated that the travel to the Philippines was in 1999.

The Tribunal also relied on certain classified evidence in reaching its decision. A discussion of the classified evidence is found in Enclosure (2) to the Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report.

6. Consultations with the CSRT Legal Advisor

The Detainee requested no witnesses and requested no additional evidence be produced; therefore, no rulings on these matters were required.

7. Conclusions of the Tribunal


Upon careful review of all the evidence presented in this matter, the Tribunal makes the following determinations:

- a. The detainee was mentally and physically capable of participating in the proceeding. No medical or mental health evaluation was deemed necessary.
- b. The detainee understood the Tribunal proceedings. Although he did not actively participate, he had no objections to the Personal Representative entering a written statement for him. The Detainee was advised by his attorney not to participate in the process. As stated in Paragraph 2 above, the written statement was obtained in previous interviews with the Detainee but was not signed or verified by the Detainee for accuracy.
- c. The detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant and is a member of, or affiliated with, al Qaida.

8. Dissenting Tribunal Member's report

None. The Tribunal reached a unanimous decision.

Respectfully submitted,




Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Tribunal President

DETAINEE ELECTION FORM

Date: 21 Sept 2004

Start Time: 1400

End Time: 1630

ISN#:  _____

Personal Representative:  _____
(Name/Rank)


Translator Required? YES Language? ARABIAC

CSRT Procedure Read to Detainee or Written Copy Read by Detainee? READ TO DETAINEE

Detainee Election:

- Wants to Participate in Tribunal
- Affirmatively Declines to Participate in Tribunal
- Uncooperative or Unresponsive

Personal Representative Comments:

Detainee  affirmatively declined to participate in the Tribunal. Detainee referenced a letter from his attorney that stated the attorney would represent him regarding his enemy combatant status and he was advised to not talk to us. Detainee spent two previous interview sessions working on a written statement, I will submit it into evidence as interview notes, as the Detainee didn't object when asked. However, he refused to sign them and attest to their accuracy.

Personal Representative:  _____

Recorder Exhibit List

For

ISN [REDACTED]

#	Title	Support	Location (Paragraph)	Classification
R1	Unclassified Summary			UNCLASSIFIED
R2	FBI Request for Redaction of National Security Information 15 Sept 04	Exhibit R8		UNCLASSIFIED
R3	USDHS, Terrorist Org Ref Guide, dtd Jan 04, pg 3	3.a.4.		UNCLASSIFIED
R4	SIR, dtd 18 Dec 02	3.a.1. 3.a.2.	Subject	SECRET
R5	JTF-170 Knowledgeability Brief, dtd 13 Jun02	3.a.1. 3.a.2. 3.b.1	Subject/5.F. Subject 5.G.	SECRET
R6	SIR, dtd 8 Oct 02	3.a.3.	2.P.2.	SECRET
R7	FBI 302, dtd 09 Jun 02	3.b.1. 3.b.2. 3.b.3.	10. 8. 9.	FOUO//LES
R8	Results of Quarterly Review of Community Counterterrorism Tiers	3.a.4.	Page 2	SECRET//NOFORN
R9	CITF Assessment 10-JAN-03	Summary		SECRET//NOFORN
R10	JTF GTMO Baseball Card	FYI		SECRET//NOFORN
R11	MFR SA [REDACTED] 24 September 2004	FYI		SECRET//NOFORN
	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION added on 27 Sept 04 per board request of 25 Sept 04			
R12	OARDEC INTEL RESPONSE dtd 25 Sep 04	R5, pg 3 and date R10		SECRET
R13	JT assessment	R7, pg 2		SECRET//NOFORN
R8	Results of Quarterly Review of Community Counterterrorism Tiers	R7 Page 2	Added page 3	SECRET//NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

Combatant Status Review Board

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (15 September 04)

Subject: Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal – AL MURBATI, Issa Ali Abdullah.

1. Under the provisions of the Secretary of the Navy Memorandum, dated 29 July 2004, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to review the detainee's designation as an enemy combatant.
2. An enemy combatant has been defined as "an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces."
3. The United States Government has previously determined that the detainee is an enemy combatant. This determination is based on information possessed by the United States that indicates that he is an Al Qaeda fighter and participated in military operations against the United States or its coalition partners.
 - a. The detainee is associated with Al Qaeda:
 1. On November 2, 2001, detainee voluntarily traveled from Bahrain to Afghanistan.
 2. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan via Pakistan where he planned to fight in the *Jihad*.
 3. Detainee was a follower of Abu Sayyef; they met in the Philippines. They discussed getting money to Arabs in Afghanistan.
 4. Abu Sayyef Group is a known terrorist organization.
 - b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners.
 1. Detainee was injured by a grenade while traveling to Khowst, Afghanistan, and given treatment at a hospital.
 2. Detainee was told that if he went to war and fought the Jihad, he would be a better person and have his 15,000 Dinar debt forgiven, and eventually he traveled to Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Exhibit R1

UNCLASSIFIED

3. Al Murbati discovered that there was not training available in Kandahar, and since he did not know how to use a Kalishnikov rifle, he traveled to Kabul by taxi, after learning there was training there.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability of evidence or witnesses.

UNCLASSIFIED

Memorandum



To : Department of Defense
Office of Administrative Review
for Detained Enemy Combatants,
Col. David Taylor, OIC, CSRT

Date 09/15/2004

From : FBI GTMO
Counterterrorism Division,
Office of General Counsel,

Subject REQUEST FOR REDACTION OF
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
ISN [REDACTED]

Pursuant to the Secretary of the Navy Order of 29 July 2004, Implementation of Combatant Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Section D, paragraph 2, the FBI requests redaction of the information herein marked¹. The FBI makes this request on the basis that said information relates to the national security of the United States². Inappropriate dissemination of said information could damage the national security of the United States and compromise ongoing FBI investigations.

CERTIFICATION THAT REDACTED INFORMATION DOES NOT SUPPORT A
DETERMINATION THAT THE DETAINEE IS NOT AN ENEMY COMBATANT

The FBI certifies the aforementioned redaction contains no information that would support a determination that the detainee is not an enemy combatant.

The following documents relative to ISN [REDACTED] have been redacted by the FBI and provided to the OARDEC, GTMO:

FD-302 dated 06/09/2002

¹Redactions are blackened out on the OARDEC provided FBI document.

²See Executive Order 12958

Memorandum from [REDACTED] to Col. David Taylor
Re: REQUEST FOR REDACTION, 09/15/2004

If you need additional assistance, please contact

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] or Intelligence Analyst
[REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]



U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Border Patrol

Terrorist Organization Reference Guide

January 2004

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Exhibit 460
R3

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Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations¹

The following descriptive list constitutes the 36 terrorist groups that currently (as of 30 January 2003) are designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The designations carry legal consequences:

- It is unlawful to provide funds or other material support to a designated FTO.
- Representatives and certain members of a designated FTO can be denied visas or excluded from the United States.
- US financial institutions must block funds of designated FTOs and their agents and must report the blockage to the US Department of the Treasury.

1. Abu Nidal organization (ANO)

a.k.a. Fatah - the Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

Description

Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in July 1988. Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. Has not staged a major attack against Western targets since the late 1980s.

Strength

Few hundred plus limited overseas support structure.

Location/Area of Operation

Elements relocated to Iraq in December 1998, where the group maintains a presence. Has an operational presence in Lebanon including in several Palestinian refugee camps. Authorities shut down the ANO's operations in Libya and Egypt in 1999. Has demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Financial problems and internal disorganization have reduced the group's activities and capabilities.

External Aid

Has received considerable support, including safehaven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations.

2. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Description

The ASG is the most violent of the separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Some ASG leaders allegedly fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet war and are students and proponents of radical Islamic teachings. The group split from the Moro National Liberation Front in the early 1990s under the leadership of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. His younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, has replaced him as the nominal leader of the group, which is composed of several semiautonomous factions.

Activities

Engages in kidnappings for ransom, bombings, assassinations, and extortion. Although from time to time it claims that its motivation is to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims, the ASG has primarily used terror for financial profit. Recent bombings may herald a return to a more radical, politicized agenda. The group's first large-scale action was a raid on the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995. In April of 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 persons, including 10 foreign tourists, from a resort in Malaysia. Separately in 2000, the group abducted several foreign journalists, three Malaysians, and a US citizen. On 27 May 2001, the ASG kidnapped three US citizens and 17 Filipinos from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including one US citizen, were murdered. During a Philippine military hostage rescue operation on 7 June 2002, US hostage Gracia Burnham was rescued, but US hostage Martin Burnham and Filipina Deborah Yap were killed during the operation. Philippine authorities say that the ASG had a role in the bombing near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga on 2 October that killed three Filipinos and one US serviceman and wounded 20 others.

Strength

Estimated to have 200 to 500 members.

Location/Area of Operation

The ASG was founded in Basilan Province and mainly operates there and in the neighboring provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago. It also operates

in the Zamboanga peninsula, and members occasionally travel to Manila and other parts of the country. The group expanded its operations to Malaysia in 2000 when it abducted foreigners from a tourist resort.

External Aid

Largely self-financing through ransom and extortion; may receive support from Islamic extremists in the Middle East and South Asia. Libya publicly paid millions of dollars for the release of the foreign hostages seized from Malaysia in 2000.

3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (al-Aqsa)

Description

The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade comprises an unknown number of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists that emerged at the outset of the current *intifadah* to attack Israeli targets. It aims to drive the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem and to establish a Palestinian state.

Activities

Al-Aqsa has carried out shootings and suicide operations against Israeli military personnel and civilians and has killed Palestinians who it believed were collaborating with Israel. At least five US citizens, four of them dual Israeli-US citizens, were killed in al-Aqsa's attacks. The group probably did not attack them because of their US citizenship. In January 2002, al-Aqsa claimed responsibility for the first suicide bombing carried out by a female.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Al-Aqsa operates mainly in the West Bank and has claimed attacks inside Israel and the Gaza Strip. It may have followers in Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon.

External Aid

Unknown.

In Response to (A) of the unclassified summary, this is false.

1. In Response to (A1) of the unclassified summary, this is false. I was not traveling to Afghanistan; I was traveling to Pakistani for medical treatment. This information is in my passport that you have in your possession.
2. In Response to (A2) of the unclassified summary, this is not true. I was working as a plumber and I fell and injured my back. The pain kept getting worse. Some people in the (NOUR) Light Mosque in Bahrain told me that I could go to Pakistan for treatment and I decided to go. I went to the Pakistani embassy and got a medical visa which stated the purpose of my visit was for medical reasons. I had planned to go to the Agha Khan hospital in Karachi Pakistan. I purchased a two-way plane ticket. I had my passport stamped at the airport in Pakistan for entry into the country. After my passport was stamped, someone tapped me on my back and asked to see my passport. This person was wearing civilian clothes. He told me that he was from the police so I handed him my passport. I was told to follow him. He took me to a small room and had me wait for a while. Then another group came in and took me to prison. The next day I was physically abused, they kicked and hit me with clubs, books, and clinched fists. The people hitting me didn't even talk; they just beat me without asking questions. After about 20 minutes, they took me to another room where there was an interrogator. This interrogator asked me why I came to Pakistan. I explained that I had come for medical reasons. The interrogator also asked if I was a member of Al Qaida or was associated with them. I said no. As I answered his questions and the interrogator pretended to write down my answers on the document in his hand. Then





interrogator gave me the document to sign and I signed it, even though I didn't read it. Three days later a new interrogator came to see me and he also asked me why I came to Pakistan. I told him for medical reasons. Then the interrogator asked me, "This document you signed; do you know what was written on it?" I said no, so the interrogator read it and had a linguist translate. The document stated that I went to Afghanistan via Pakistan. It stated I was going to Khost Afghanistan, and then back to Pakistan. The document also stated that the Pakistani authorities had caught me. They made up this story because the United States was paying \$5000 to capture terrorists. I signed this document because I was being beaten.

3. In Response to (A3) of the unclassified summary, this is false. I am not a member of Abu Sayyef. I don't know what this is. I did go to the Philippines as a tourist for 10 days. This is in my passport that you have. How is it possible that Abu Sayyef is willing trust anyone to come close to him if he is a big terrorist as the United States claims? I don't even know him, so how could this be possible? It is not. It doesn't even have to be Abu Sayyef; it could be anyone. For example, can anyone visiting Washington go and visit President Bush? The answer is no. Does President Bush just go to anyone in the street and say, "Go do something for me", after only knowing them for 10 days? I think not.

In Response to (B) of the unclassified summary, this is false.

1. In Response to (B1 through B3) of the unclassified summary, these are all false. There was a bomb that exploded while I was incarcerated in Pakistan. I was being moved from one prison to another and was handcuffed and blindfolded. There was a lot of trouble in Pakistan

during this time. I heard a loud explosion and when I awoke I was in a hospital. I was told that a bomb had exploded. They took me from the hospital to another prison where I stayed for about a month. Then they turned me over to US authorities. At first I was scared because of the abuse I had received by the Pakistani authorities. I thought it would be even worse, that you might even kill me. The Pakistanis had told me that if you think we are bad; wait till United States gets their hands on you. I was interrogated twice in the United States Embassy in Pakistan and I told two different versions of how I was injured that conflicts with what I just told you. During the first interrogation, I said I was on my way to Khost Afghanistan. I had just exited the bus when a bomb close by exploded and injured me. Then during the second interrogation, I said that my injury was caused by a bus accident. The interrogators asked me how come I said in the first interrogation that a bomb injured me and in the second interview I said I was injured in a bus accident. I became very afraid and confused; I didn't know what to say, this wasn't my story. I was scared and could not focus on the story. All I could remember was all the kicking and abuse by the Pakistani authorities so I was very scared. This was what the Pakistanis told me to say. They did this when they read me the documents I signed. They said tell this story to the Americans and I didn't remember it all. The Pakistanis told me I had better tell this story because I had already signed on the document and the Americans will think you are a terrorist and will behead you or imprison you for life.



10

OBSERVATIONS ملاحظات

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
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Passport No. 123456789	جواز رقم 123456789
Date 10/12/97	المؤرخ في 10/12/97
Issued at Bahrain	الصادر في البحرين

STATE OF BAHRAIN



10 REVENUE

OFFICE



15

EXIT 20
24 MAR 1998
KING FAHAD CAUSEWAY - BAHRAIN

17 APR 1998
17 APR 1998
ENTRY 58

10 MAR 1998
ENTRY 30
KING FAHAD CAUSEWAY - BAHRAIN

التصاريح
MISAS

10



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ENTRY 36
8651 MAR 3 -
KING FAHAD CAUSEWAY - BAHRAIN




24 JAN 1998
ENTRY 28
KING FAHAD CAUSEWAY - BAHRAIN

25 FEB 1998

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



19



الافئرات
VISAS

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

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الافئرات
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



21



التأثيرات
VISAS

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Visit To Philippines ↓

23

PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS
 PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION
 DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION
 VISAS IMMIGRATION
 AUG 30 1999
 AUG 30 1999
 PHILIPPINES 2006-147-244
 PHILIPPINES 2006-147-244

22

مطار البحرين الدولي
 22 MAY 2000
 KING FAHD CAUSEWAY CHECKPOINT
 VISA
 مطار البحرين الدولي
 29 AUG 1999
 BAHRAIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
 EXIT 89
 دولة البحرين
 جوازات مطار البحرين الدولي
 76
 1 NOV 2001
 STATE OF BAHRAIN
 BAHRAIN INT. AIRPORT PASSENGERS
 EXIT 76

Medical Visa
to Pakistan ↓

25

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
PAKISTAN

Seal (Muzaffar Habibullah
Signature and
Countersigned by
Embassy of Pakistan)

Also valid for children/children
endorsed on the passport

Purpose of visit Medical Treatment

Duration of each stay 1 month

No. of visits allowed Single

Good for journey upto 27-11-2001

Date of issue 28-10-2001

Type of visa Entry

Visa No. 733 / 2001

No. of Passport 925403

Visa. S.No. VB386283

Embassy of Pakistan
Karachi

24

02 NOV 2001

10 DAY
F.V.A.
ENTRY
VISA

التأشيرات
المدنية

مفتاح جسر اللكهنو

19 صدر 1221

دخول ENTRY

QUAID E AZAM INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT, KARACHI (PAKISTAN)

24

27

سعود

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التأثيرات
VISAS

26

سعود

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التأثيرات
VISAS

هيئة تحرير الملك فهد
 ١٩ صفر ١٤٢١
 ٧٤ خروج EXIT ٧٤

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
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
الفيزيات
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 الفيزيات
 VISAS


التأشيرات
VISAS



التأشيرات
VISAS



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الفايز
VISAS

مملكة البحرين
البحرين

ENTRY 28
14 SEP 1999
مطار البحرين الدولي


BAHRAIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
ENTRY 82
5 JUL 1999
مطار البحرين الدولي

14 SEP 1999
مطار البحرين الدولي

VISAS

الفايز
VISAS

مطار الملك فهد - الرياض
23 MAY 2000
EXIT 75
KING FAHAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT



Handwritten: 14
PASSPORT REGULATIONS 3.5

Bahrain Passports are issued and renewed by the Passport Directorate; Bahrain subjects resident abroad should submit their applications concerning passport renewal or additions, or in the case of loss, to the nearest Bahrain Consulate or any Authority which acts in the name of the State of Bahrain.

This passport is valid for travel to the countries named on page eight.

Bahrain Passports are issued for a period of five years, unless otherwise stated.

CAUTION

This passport is an important document, and care must be taken against its falling into the hands of any person who has no right to use it; and, if destroyed or lost, this should be reported immediately to the Passport Directorate; or if abroad, to the nearest Bahrain Consulate or any Authority which acts in the name of the State of Bahrain. No new passports are issued except after exhaustive inquiries.

Passport No.


925403



925403


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Personal Representative Review of the Record of Proceedings

I acknowledge that on 30 September 2004 I was provided the opportunity to review the record of proceedings for the Combatant Status Review Tribunal involving ISN # 


I have no comments.

My comments are attached.


Maj., USAF

30 SEPT 2004
Date

Signature

ISN 
Enclosure (5)