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Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Guantanamo Bay Detainee Treatment, July 13, 2005


Congressional Quarterly
http://www.cqpolitics.com


JULY 13, 2005


SPEAKERS: U.S. SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER (R-VA) (CHAIRMAN), U.S. SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ), U.S. SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE (R-OK), U.S. SENATOR PAT ROBERTS (R-KS), U.S. SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL), U.S. SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS (R-ME), U.S. SENATOR JOHN ENSIGN (R-NV), U.S. SENATOR JIM TALENT (R-MO), U.S. SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA), U.S. SENATOR LINDSEY O. GRAHAM (R-SC), U.S. SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE (R-NC), U.S. SENATOR JOHN CORNYN (R-TX), U.S. SENATOR JOHN THUNE (R-SD), U.S. SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI), RANKING MEMBER U.S. SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY (D-MA), U.S. SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD (D-WV), U.S. SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN (D-CT), U.S. SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI), U.S. SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA (D-HI), U.S. SENATOR BILL NELSON (D-FL), U.S. SENATOR BEN NELSON (D-NE), U.S. SENATOR MARK DAYTON (D-MN), U.S. SENATOR EVAN BAYH (D-IN), U.S. SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (D-NY).


WARNER: Today we meet to receive the testimony of the U.S. Southern Command investigation into the e-mails that came to light as a consequence of a FOIA request in December of 2004. The SOUTHCOM commander, General Craddock, tasked, first, General Furlow and then, subsequently, General Schmidt to undertake the investigation. And we will put into the record, gentlemen, the order that you signed out, General Craddock, to have this investigation done. So we welcome our witnesses this morning: General Craddock, commander of the U.S. Southern Command; Lieutenant General Randall Schmidt, USAF, Air Force, senior investigating officer; and Brigadier General John Furlow, the investigating officer. We thank our witnesses and all others who are in attendance here this morning. In December 2004, pursuant to the allegations of detainee abuse at Guantanamo Bay, which were brought to light pursuant to a FOIA request for the FBI e-mails, General Craddock, you took very prompt action and convened this panel to investigate. This is the 12th major, senior-level review of detainee operations and allegations of detainee abuse that's completed by various elements of the Department of Defense and, indeed, an independent panel, the Schlesinger-Brown panel. In my judgment, the department has performed credibly in investigating allegations of abuse and failure to follow professional standards and the law and regulation in these instances. The allegations of abuse referred to in the FBI e-mails occurred from the period of August to December 2002, and had come to the leadership of the joint task force Guantanamo and SOUTHCOM, and were, in fact, under investigation at that time. Appropriate procedural and disciplinary actions had been taken in some of the cases. And General Craddock this morning will describe in detail the 28 e-mails which were turned into the director of the FBI in response to his request to his agents, and detail each of them as they were examined.

WARNER: The report before us this morning by General Craddock and his team indicated in three instances -- just three instances -- interrogations at Guantanamo used techniques that violated Army doctrine and guidance from the Department of Defense. Now, this, apparently, is three out of some 24,000 interrogations that were conducted at Guantanamo over the past three years. Now, General, we'll also ask you to brief the committee in some detail. And, by the way, colleagues, we'll have this open hearing, which Senator Levin and I felt was essential, and this will be followed by a closed hearing. But in the course of the open hearing, we will ask you, General Craddock, to give us your explanation for, in effect, reversing the finding of your two colleagues, General Schmidt and Furlow, and I quote that finding, the report: "Major General Miller should be held accountable for failing to supervise interrogation of ISN-063" -- that's a high-value detainee -- "and should be admonished for that failure," end quote. And that's on page 2 of the Schmidt-Furlow report. You, General Craddock, as the convening authority and the final reviewer, did not agree with this finding and you will give us your thoughts on that. I feel very strongly that the department and other entities which have examined this whole series of incidents at the prison -- it clearly indicates that this nation is a nation of laws and it will not tolerate inappropriate behavior by members of the armed forces or anyone else. And this nation will investigate allegations of wrongdoing. And in accordance with due process, if persons are found who have violated those laws, they will be held responsible. And this report is another very important step in that direction. I think that will conclude my opening remarks. Senator Levin?

LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening the hearing. Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses here today to discuss the results of the investigation of Generals Schmidt and Furlow into allegations of abuses at Guantanamo. More specifically, the allegations contained in specific e-mails from FBI agents at Guantanamo witnessing interrogation practices of DOD intelligence personnel. These FBI e-mails, which came to light in December of last year following a Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, request, spoke of Department of Defense interrogators', quote, "torture techniques," close quote and, quote, "coercive techniques in the military's interviewing toolkit," close quote. One FBI agent at the time expressed alarm over DOD interrogation plans for one Guantanamo Bay detainee saying, quote, "You won't believe it," close quote. Subsequent e-mails described abuses that FBI agents had witnessed, including detainees being chained in a fetal position on the floor for 18 to 24 hours at a time, having urinated and defecated on themselves and being subjected to extreme cold. The Schmidt-Furlow report confirms that detainees were subjected to, quote, "degrading and abusive," close quote, treatment in the course of interrogations at Guantanamo. The report finds the use of techniques such as short-shackling techniques in a fetal position for hours at a time or using military working dogs to intimidate detainees during interrogation sessions or a female interrogator rubbing up against a detainee's back and running her fingers through his hair is a form of gender coercion. It is clear from the report that detainee mistreatment was not simply the product of a few rogue military police on a night shift. Rather, this mistreatment arose from the use of aggressive interrogation techniques. The purpose of those activities, whether authorized or not, was to obtain intelligence. The report of Generals Schmidt and Furlow does not resolve a number of critical questions surrounding the military's interrogation of detainees at Guantanamo. From the FBI documents released under the FOIA request, we know that FBI concerns and objections went beyond the specific allegations of abuse. The FBI agents questioned not only the effectiveness but the propriety of DOD's aggressive interrogation techniques. The report does not address those concerns. As a result, the Schmidt-Furlow report does not examine the, quote, "heated debate" between FBI agents and DOD commanders at Guantanamo, which was about propriety and effectiveness. Their report does address whether techniques were authorized or not authorized and found that some were and some were not. But their conclusions on the most egregious techniques remain classified.

LEVIN: So from what we can determine, they do not look, again, at propriety or effectiveness of aggressive interrogation techniques, but rather at the authorization or lack of authorization of the use of those techniques. The FBI was so concerned about coercive Defense Department interrogation techniques that its agents at Guantanamo were told to, quote, "stand clear" when military intelligence took over an interrogation. The report does not shed light on those discussions, or what, if any, follow up to those discussions was made. Nor does the report include documents related to these discussions, such as a May 30, 2003 electronic communication, or E.C., by FBI agents at Guantanamo, which, according to another FBI document, summarizes the FBI objections and includes -- and here I'm referring to the May 30, 2003 E.C. -- it includes as attachments a number of military documents discussing the authorization to use aggressive techniques. This committee needs to have the FBI documents relating to DOD interrogation techniques used at Guantanamo which FBI agents at the time believed were coercive or abusive. And following an earlier briefing on a related subject, I requested that FBI Director Mueller provide those documents. In addition, the report itself states that its investigation did not attempt to review the legality of interrogation techniques approved by the secretary of defense. The fact that a technique may have been approved does not resolve the question of its legality. There is a confusing aspect to the report which highlights some of these omissions. The report states that the current guidance for Guantanamo approved by the secretary of defense fails to define the term "humane treatment" and it recommends that this question be taken up by future policy review. So far, so good. But the report nonetheless goes on to state that "there was no evidence of inhumane treatment," close quote. This is seemingly inconsistent with the absence of a definition of "humane treatment." But to compound the confusion, the report states that it found -- it did find "degrading and abusive treatment," in quotes. First saying that there is an absence of a definition of humane treatment, but then saying that degrading and abusive treatment isn't the same as inhumane treatment is, frankly, truly a head scratcher. We are left once again, also, with a lack of accountability for the confirmed mistreatment of detainees. Generals Schmidt and Furlow recommended that Major General Miller be held accountable for, quote, "failing to supervise the interrogation of one high-value detainee," and, quote, "be admonished for that failure." However, General Craddock, who is with us this morning, the U.S. Southern Command commander, disapproved that recommendation. The recommendations of General Schmidt and Furlow include the need for a policy-level review regarding the, quote, "status and treatment of detainees other than prisoners of war." They also call for a review of interrogation techniques and the role of military police in, quote, "setting the conditions," close quote, for subsequent interrogations. And I wholeheartedly agree with Generals Schmidt and Furlow.

LEVIN: Their recommendations, in my judgment, reinforce the need to establish an independent commission to address the issues left unaddressed by this report and a number of other issues which have been identified which have so far not been addressed by various inquiries and investigations. The very creation of such an independent commission will help protect our soldiers should they ever end up in enemy custody, by showing the world that we are determined that our detention and interrogation policies reflect the values that we cherish as Americans. Again, I welcome the testimony and look forward to it.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator. I'd like to also bring out that there were some 24,000 interrogations that were examined by this team and only a very few fall into the category of violations to Army doctrine.

LEVIN: Just on that point, if I could, Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that 24,000 interrogations were not investigated by this panel, but the e-mails of the FBI were the subject of their inquiry.

WARNER: Well, we'll bring clarity to that in the course of the hearing. But I think we've got to always be mindful of the fact that we're fighting a war and the fact that some very, very few individuals, whether it was Abu Ghraib or here, did violate Army doctrine and other rules and regulations should in no way reflect adversely upon the bravery and the courage of the men and women in the armed forces fighting terrorism the world over.

LEVIN: I think there's a real consensus on that point. I couldn't agree with you more, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: I thank you. General Craddock, glad to hear from you.

CRADDOCK: Thank you. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to brief you on the results of the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation that I directed into allegations of detainee abuse at our Guantanamo Bay detention facility. As the commander of the United States Southern Command, I am responsible for ensuring that detention and interrogation operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo meet the high standards that our nation expects from its military. I want to make it clear that I have full faith and confidence in the fine work that the servicemembers and the leaders of Joint Task Force Guantanamo are doing each and every day for our nation. Their work contributes to our nation's safety and their adherence to the highest standards of humane treatment of the detainees under their charge is lauded by all who visit the facility. I would also like to point out that the operations at Guantanamo are still providing intelligence that supports the day-to-day operations of our war fighters engaged in the global war on terrorism, are helping our allies and partners in their fight against terrorists and are keeping dangerous enemy combatants off the battlefield.

CRADDOCK: Of the more than 70,000 detainees who have been captured in the global war on terror, less than 800 have been sent to Guantanamo because of the threat they posed and the intelligence they possessed. Today, approximately 520 detainees remain at Guantanamo, and approximately 235 have been released or transferred to the custody of other countries because they no longer pose a threat or they no longer have intelligence value. Today, we have in our custody at Guantanamo terrorist trainers, bomb-makers, terrorist recruiters, facilitators and financiers, Osama bin Laden's bodyguards and would-be suicide bombers. Through them, we have learned the organizational structure of Al Qaida and other terrorist groups, the extent of the terrorist presence in Europe, the United States and the Middle East, the methods of and location of terrorist recruitment centers, how operatives are trained, and Al Qaida's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. One enemy combatant has provided insights into Al Qaida preoperational planning for the 11 September 2001 attacks, to include methods and criteria for recruiting operatives for the attacks and the logistics involved in carrying them out. He described the facilitators he met along the way, the methods of financing the operation, the way he obtained his U.S. visa, and the logistics involved in traveling to the United States and communicating with his handlers along the way. This particular detainee, Mohamed Al Kahtani, has, during his interrogation, sworn his loyalty to Osama bin Laden. He was to take part in the September 11th attacks, but the Immigration and Naturalization Service blocked his entry into the United States in August of that year at the Orlando International Airport. He was captured in December 2001, on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border with other Al Qaida members and brought to Guantanamo in February 2002. In July 2002, a fingerprint match from the INS verified Kahtani's presence in Orlando prior to the September 11th attacks and increased interest in getting him to reveal what he might know about future attacks planned around the one-year anniversary of 9/11. Into the fall of 2002, Kahtani successfully resisted all interrogation efforts using standard criminal investigation techniques. This led the interrogators at Guantanamo to request the approval of more aggressive interrogation techniques, which were approved by higher authority. During Kahtani's interrogation, from November 2002 through January 2003, the application of these techniques by the joint task force interrogators led to breaking Kahtani's resistance and to solid intelligence gains. These and other intelligence gains come only through persistence, patience and diligence. These traits, along with the highest standards of professional conduct, are the hallmarks of the men and women serving our nation today as part of Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Now, let me address the investigation. The allegations in the Federal Bureau of Investigation e-mails came to light as the result of the public release of a series of FBI e-mails that contained these allegations. After a review of these e-mails, following their public release in December of last year, I determined that the allegations merited a detailed examination in order to establish the truth and ascertain what, if any, actions needed to be taken. I ordered the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation and appointed Brigadier General John Furlow, the deputy commander for my Army component command, as the investigating officer. Brigadier General Furlow was directed to address the following allegations that were drawn from the FBI e-mails.

CRADDOCK: One, that military interrogators improperly used military working dogs during interrogation sessions to threaten detainees or for some other purpose. Two, that military interrogators improperly used duct tape to cover a detainee's mouth and head. Three, that Department of Defense interrogators improperly impersonated FBI agents and Department of State officers during the interrogation of detainees. Four, that on several occasions DOD interrogators improperly played loud music and yelled loudly at detainees. Five, that military personnel improperly interfered with FBI interrogators in the performance of their FBI duties. Six, that military interrogators improperly used sleep depravation against detainees. Seven, that military interrogators improperly chained detainees and placed them in a fetal position on the floor and denied them food and water for long periods of time. And eight, that military interrogators improperly used extremes of heat and cold during their interrogation of detainees. Subsequent to his initial appointment, I also directed General Furlow to investigate two additional allegations concerning a female military interrogator performing a lap dance on a detainee and the use of red ink as fake menstrual blood during an interrogation. These allegations came from a separate document. I did not limit General Furlow to these allegations. I gave him the flexibility to bring into his investigation any additional allegations of detainee abuse that he might discover during the course of his work. On 28 February 2005, after two months of investigation, General Furlow advised me that he needed to interview officers who were senior in grade to him. As a result, I appointed Lieutenant General Mark Schmidt, the commander of my Air Force component command, as the senior investigating officer. Generals Schmidt and Furlow are here with me today and in a moment, they will brief you on the conduct and findings of their investigation. Their report reflects the combined findings and conclusions of the initial investigative efforts and the combined investigative efforts of both of these officers. General Schmidt submitted his initial report to me on the 1st of April. After a review, I directed on the 5th of May that the investigation be reopened to consider two memos from the December 2004 time frame that has been recently discovered regarding a special interrogation plan. While the investigative team was completing this additional task, I further directed, on the 2nd of June, that General Schmidt address a second set of new allegations made by a detainee that also concerned a special interrogation plan. General Schmidt completed his investigation on the 9th of June, at which time my staff judge advocate began a thorough legal review of the report.

CRADDOCK: I have completed my personal review of the report and taken my actions with regards to the report's findings and recommendations. I will inform you of my actions after General Schmidt and General Furlow brief you on their investigation and findings. So I will turn it over to General Schmidt and General Furlow.

WARNER: General Schmidt?

SCHMIDT: Thank you, sir. Senator Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to brief the results of this Army Regulation 15-6 investigation into the FBI allegations of detainee abuse at Guantanamo. On 29 December 2004, General Furlow was appointed. He brought three U.S. Army staff members with him to help do this investigation. And then on the 28th of February, I included my staff judge advocate and two other action officers, and we were the basis -- the eight members that completed this investigation. I provided to all the members a copy of the report, and I apologize for its length. There are about 21 pages. If I go through the report, I will refer to those pages as I talk about the conduct of the report, what we found and what our recommendations and findings were. That would be helpful. So I will refer to those pages for the members.

WARNER: We will put the complete statements and reports of each of the investigating officers in the record.

SCHMIDT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we go to page two, you can see the purpose, as was stated by General Craddock, was to investigate those FBI allegations into the misconduct. Now, I will tell you, it was a very focused investigation. It was about the FBI allegation. But we were also asked to look at whatever else we found in the way of discovery that led to detainee abuse. So that was our charter. We were also asked to determine accountability for substantiated violations. And then in the end I was to recommend action at the appropriate level for any accountability that could be identified for substantiated violations. On page two, as General Craddock has said, the e-mails from the FBI generated this investigation. The FBI Inspection Division sent an e-mail survey out to 493 FBI personnel who had been assigned to Guantanamo Bay from 9 September '01 to 9 July '04. In response to those surveys, 408 FBI agents had nothing to report. There were 59 who came back with no responses, and that was determined by the FBI to be a negative reply as well. Twenty-six agents replied that they had some indication or knowledge that they had perceived aggressive treatment or aggressive interrogation techniques that would not be consistent with FBI interrogation techniques, and they reported those back to the FBI.

SCHMIDT: Of those, there were multiple reports of the same type of event. And we boiled those down to eight and we split one because it involved two different categories and we called it nine. So out of the 26 that came back positive, we looked at nine. Slide four please. The scope of the review -- you can see on the slide it was fairly comprehensive, even though this was a focused report. The investigation was directed and accomplished under the informal procedures of the Army Regulation 15-6. This A.R. 15-6 investigation centered on the FBI alleged abuses occurring during interrogation operations. We found incidents of abuse during detention operations, all of which were appropriately addressed by the command. The investigation team conducted a comprehensive review of thousands of documents and statements pertaining to allegations of abuse occurring at Gitmo, to include the complete medical records of the subjects of a first and second special interrogation plan. The team interviewed 30 FBI agents, conducted interviews of over 100 personnel from 6 January '05 to 24 March '05 and had access to hundreds of interviews conducted by several recent investigations. These interviews included personnel assigned to Guantanamo, U.S. Southern Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the tenure of JTFs 160, 170 at Guantanamo. It included 76 DOD personnel, to include every general officer who commanded the task force 160, 170 or the joint task force at Gitmo. Additionally, we considered the abuse allegations made by the two high-value detainees themselves, as General Craddock has said. The investigation team attempted to determine if the allegations alleged by the FBI, in fact, occurred. During the course of the follow-up investigations, the A.R. 15-6 team also considered allegations raised specifically by the detainees who were the subject of those plans. The investigating team applied a preponderant standard of proof consistent with guidance contained in A.R. 15-6. Much of the testimony was obtained from witnesses that served as much as three years earlier and sometimes for 45 days or less. Civilian witnesses were not required to cooperate nor under subpoena to answer questions. The team also applied guidance contained in Field Manual 3452, commander of U.S. Southern Command and secretary of defense memorandums, authorizing special interrogation techniques if deciding if a particular interrogation approach feel properly within an authorized technique. In those cases in which the team concluded that the allegation had, in fact, occurred, the team then considered whether the incident was in compliance with interrogation techniques that were approved either at the time of the incident or subsequent to the incident. In those cases where it was determined the allegation occurred and to not have been authorized technique, the team then reviewed whether disciplinary action had already been taken and the propriety of that action. On 28 March '05, General Craddock asked me to determine accountability for those substantiated violations that had no command action taken. We did not review the legal validity of the various interrogation techniques outlined in Army Field Manual 3452 or those approved by the secretary of defense.

SCHMIDT: If we could go to slide five please, this is a summary of findings and I will go through the findings item by item in detail in the following slides. You can see the nine FBI allegations. Two were unsubstantiated; we found no basis for those allegations. Two were substantiated and, in fact, were not authorized. Five were substantiated, however, they were determined to be authorized under the current guidance. Interrogation of a particular ISN-063 -- and this is one person -- in our judgment resulted in abusive and degrading treatment. And that was determined by the cumulative effect of creative, persistent and lengthy interrogations which resulted in that determination. Third bullet: There was a threat to the second high-value detainee that was discovered during the investigation. As the bottom line, though, we found no torture. Detention and interrogation operations were safe, secure and humane. Slide six: To the unsubstantiated allegations, on the left-hand column on your slides, you will see an asterisk. Any of the allegations that we discussed in the briefing that have an asterisk relate to the FBI allegations. Those that are not relate to discovery.

WARNER: General, we don't have page numbers on our copy.

SCHMIDT: I'm sorry, sir, but at the very bottom of the right there's a faint number -- at the very bottom of the right-hand part of the...

WARNER: Oh, I see.

(CROSSTALK)

SCHMIDT: I'm sorry.

WARNER: That's an unusual way to do it. I see it now. All right.

SCHMIDT: I'm sorry, sir, and I'm currently briefing from...

WARNER: I'm not holding you responsible, but we thank you for bringing it to my attention.

SCHMIDT: Yes, sir. Currently briefing from slide six. Reference to A: Investigation revealed that interrogators impersonated FBI agents. And we believe that some of the FBI agents characterized this as interference. All testimony indicated the FBI impersonations were isolated and they were stopped upon FBI request. Further, we could find no FBI agent that could cite an actual example of interference with their mission. In reference to the allegation, it was unsubstantiated. And, B, regarding the allegation by an agent -- she observed a detainee to be deprived of food and water. We considered both the statement she made on 12 July '04, e-mail and her 9 September FBI telephonic interview. We made several efforts to conduct our own interview, but our FBI liaison continually advised us that she was unavailable. During the course of our investigation, we were unable to corroborate any allegations that detainees had been denied food or water. Also because of the inconsistencies in that agent's testimony and the lack of any other corroboration, we were unable to substantiate the second allegation. To slide seven.

SCHMIDT: It's very important, I think, that we understand what we used as the authorities. Field Manual 3452 is the baseline providing doctrinal guidance, techniques and procedures governing employment of interrogators as HUMINT collection assets. This was all used and it was in force at the time Guantanamo interrogation operations began in March of 2002. Slide eight? Due to the difficulties, as General Craddock said, of interrogating a single high-value detainee, ISN-063, Joint Task Force Guantanamo requested on 11 October '02 additional techniques. As you look at that slide, all of the category one, category two and category three techniques were on the list requested by the joint task force. On the 2nd of December, the secretary of defense approved the ones that have the green check marks. You can see, it's all of the category one, category two and only one of the category three. After approximately 45 days, all category two and category three techniques were rescinded. On slide number nine, on the 16th of April, the secretary of defense approved these interrogation techniques, and this is the sole authority in existence today. Field Manual 3452 is used as a guide. As you look at the slide, you'll notice that B, I, O and X are highlighted. Those techniques, if they're to be used, require the showing of military necessity and advanced notice to the secretary of defense. These are in force today. Slide 10? I put a slide together that just shows that in a more concise way, but I've highlighted a basic premise and guidance that has been inherent in every change of guidance and policy that's come down, and that's the baseline of humane treatment of all detainees.

WARNER: General, the committee will ask that you provide for the record, first, referring to slide eight, the green check marks, all approved by SecDef. Then, in what form did he rescind those; by written communication, I presume?

SCHMIDT: That's affirmative, sir. Correct.

WARNER: Can we have copies of that written communication?

SCHMIDT: Yes, sir. We will provide those to you.

WARNER: Now, was that written communication different than the memo of 16 April '03? Was that a separate document?

SCHMIDT: Separate document, also written. And we can provide that for record as well.

WARNER: All right. Thank you. SCHMIDT: Humane treatment again being the baseline of any issuance of policy and guidance regarding interrogation. So move to slide 11.

WARNER: Before we leave nine, we'll need to have an application (ph) of your note there, that techniques B, I, O and X require showing of military necessity and advance notice.

WARNER: The full document that's behind that, we'll need that also.

SCHMIDT: Yes, sir, we'll do that. On slide 11, I thought it would be illustrative to understand how the broad guidance for techniques that were available to the joint task force -- not directed to use, but were available for Joint Task Force Guantanamo to use on this particular detainee, how it moved from a high order, fairly benign-looking, technique into an application that you will see later in the briefing that got very specific. On slide 11, it says Field Manual 3452 has an example of a technique called futility. The intent is that the interrogator convinces the source that resistance to questioning is futile. That guidance is now an approved technique chosen by the JTF. The process it goes through to be used -- there's an interrogator who's normally an NCO, constructs a written interrogation plan. That is vetted through a team chief and an intelligence control element supervisor, which could be Defense Intelligence Agency or an officer. That's at the 05 or G-14 level. That's approved and vetted through that level. And then the interrogation is conducted with a translator, in consultation possibly with another analyst. The Guantanamo example that I put at the bottom there is for futility -- again, convincing the source that resistance is futile -- "tell the detainee about how Al Qaida is falling apart, talk about how everyone has been killed or captured, and tell him what we know about him so that he feels that he's already been exploited at some point and it's futile to withhold information."However, as it gets down to the interrogation room, that may be -- it may involve gender coercion via some domination. The detainee does not want to hear this and he does not want to hear it from a woman. You will see that being straddled, not touching, massaged, and maybe mild noninjurious touching, such as putting perfume on the arm and that sort of thing, invades the personal space and this is part of how they make the futility element work with this more aggressive technique.

WARNER: Now, all of those actions would be done by a female?

SCHMIDT: That could have been done by a female. In this case, it was. And we will talk about that specific interrogation. This is an example of how top-down policy was applied at Guantanamo. On the next page, there is a second example. From the field manual again, 3452, example was ego down. What that means is you lower -- it's an approach based on attacking the source's sense of personal worth -- again, the same process. From the NCO, vetted through about the 05 G-14 level, and then the interrogation is conducted with the enlisted personnel. To bring the ego down, the Gitmo application example, the mother and the sister of the detainee were told they were whores. He was forced to wear women's lingerie, multiple allegations of homosexuality, and his comrades were aware of that. He was forced to dance with a male interrogator, subject to strip searches for control measures, not for security, and he was forced to perform dog tricks -- all this to lower his personal sense of worth.

SCHMIDT: That's from the higher order technique down to an application. And somewhere in there there has to be a translation. And that's where we started looking for accountability, in the translation from the high-order example of a technique to the application. And we will go through those, sir, as we go through the briefing. As we go to slide 13, we begin to talk about the allegations. Again, on the left-hand side of the briefing, if you see an asterisk, that relates directly to something that was observed by an FBI agent that did not conform to FBI protocol for interrogation and they found to be aggressive. We found these two substantiated allegations to be not authorized. The chaining of detainees to the floor -- they were short-shackled to the floor in an interrogation room -- chaining the detainees in this manner was used as a force protection measure in the early stages of operation. It is now specifically prohibited by Guantanamo's standard operating procedures. We also determined that the chaining to the floor, the short- shackling, where the handcuffs are put down at the floor level, was only done briefly. It was done as a force protection measure, and it was never done in the interrogation; "briefly" meaning awaiting interrogation. That has now been stopped. So that was substantiated. This was not construed to be a stress position and it was not considered to be overly abusive. There was no injury. There was no pain involved in this. It was a force security measure. On the second one, an interrogator directed the use of duct tape to quiet a detainee. This was not authorized. In this case, the detainee was resisting interrogation by continuous chanting; by various witnesses, one was chanting a resistance mantra, another one was chanting things from the Koran. At the direction of the civilian intelligence control element chief, tape was used to quiet the detainee. This intelligence chief who authorized that was verbally admonished by the judge advocate general at Guantanamo. Slide 14: This slide refers to the general population -- what we found -- and does not necessarily apply to ISN-063. We will treat him independently, and another, second, high-value detainee. In the general population, the first four -- A, B, C and D on your briefing on slide 14 -- were alleged by the FBI. The yelling and loud music: We found that to be substantiated.

SCHMIDT: It happened and it was authorized under Field Manual 3452, under the technique of futility. Under B, impersonation of FBI, Department of State agents was authorized under a secretary of defense action memo December '02 under category one: deception. C, the air conditioners, was not authorized prior to 16 December '03 under environmental manipulation, but it was authorized under the secretary of defense's 16 April '03 memo. Environmental manipulation was approved as appropriate and humane interrogation technique. B, disrupt sleep patterns. That was authorized by secretary of defense 16 April '03 memo, "Sleep Adjustment." Now, some of these events happened before 16 April. But if they were judged to be appropriate as a technique in this case at that time, we found that they should have been appropriate prior. E, the female interrogator approached the detainee from behind, rubbed his back, whispered in his ear and ran fingers through his hair. That was authorized by the field manual under the futility technique. F, the female interrogator put perfume on a detainee's arm; also authorized under futility, also authorized under the action memo from the secretary of defense under "mild, noninjurious physical contact." The last one, G, under substantiated findings, involved the case of the female interrogator told the detainee that the red marking on her hand was menstrual blood, and then wiped her hand on the detainee. This was a not-authorized event. It was a spontaneous act of revenge by the interrogator. She had been spit on by the detainee. She left the room. She was angry. She put some marker on her hand, walked back in, put it on him and said, "Do you know what that is?" And he goes, "No." And she told him. And it, in fact, unsettled him. She was verbally reprimanded, removed from interrogation duties for an unspecified time; we determined about 30 days. She was retrained and then she was reinstated. We listed these female coercive substantiated findings because we needed to dispel the idea that there had been a lap dance committed. And we could find no evidence that had ever occurred. But there was enough of these coercive sort of things with female invasion of space that that could have been interpreted by an FBI agent. So we looked at all of these. Slide 15 please. Now we get to the isolated case -- and this is where most of the findings we have that we've classified as abusive or degrading treatment are concerned with ISN-063.

SCHMIDT: And you'll see on slide 15, this is not a good person. This is not a person we have any compassion for, and it was difficult to find any pity for this man. Saudi citizen and Al Qaida operative, denied entry into the U.S., as General Craddock said. And it was just a matter of a sharp agent that kept him from entering the United States through Orlando. He was captured in Afghanistan and he came to Guantanamo in February '02. He admitted to being the 20th hijacker, and he expected to fly on United Airline flight 93. He proved to have intimate knowledge of future plans. He successfully resisted standard interrogation techniques at Guantanamo for eight months, and he is the genesis for the request by the joint task force at Guantanamo for more techniques that might be able to get past his resistance training. Slide 16: Referencing ISN-063 -- and this is all about this one individual -- A, B and C, as you can see, involved gender coercion, invasion of space and futility. And that involved the straddling -- twice it happened while M.P.s held him down while a female interrogator straddled him without placing weight on the detainee. Invasion of space. B, the female interrogator on one occasion massaged the back and neck of ISN-063 over his clothing. C, female interrogators on numerous occasions invaded the personal space of ISN-063 to disrupt his concentration. Asterisk on D, meaning it was observed by the FBI. On numerous occasions between November '02 and January '03, ISN-063 was yelled at or subjected to loud music during the interrogation. That was an authorized technique on ISN-063. Slide 17: These are all substantiated findings. And up front these all fall under the broad technique of pride and ego down, which is an authorized technique. E, ISN-063 was told his mother and sister were whores. He was forced to wear a bra and a thong placed on his head during the course of interrogation. Twice interrogators told him he was a homosexual or had homosexual tendencies and that other detainees knew. He was forced to dance with a male interrogator. He was subjected to several strip searches as a control measure, not for security. An interrogator tied a leash to his hand chains, led him around the room and conducted a series of dog tricks. Slide 18: The first two have the asterisk, observed or reported through FBI allegations. Air conditioners were adjusted to make the rooms uncomfortable.

SCHMIDT: That was not authorized prior to 16 December. However, it was authorized by the secretary of defense 16 April '03 under environmental manipulation and its an approved, appropriate humane interrogation technique. L, twice interrogators brought military working dogs into the interrogation room and directed to growl, bark and show teeth at the detainee. Dogs were authorized, under the secretary of defense action memo -- again, the additional techniques, 2 December '02, category two, individual phobias. Both of those were FBI alleged, observed. M, interrogators subjected ISN-063 to segregation from the general population from 8 August '02 to 15 January '03, and that's 160 days. That was authorized by the secretary of defense action memo of 2 December '02, category two, isolation facility. And N, interrogators subjected ISN-063 to 18- to 20-hour interrogations per day. Those occurred 48 out of a 54-day straight period. That was authorized by the secretary of defense action memo, 2 December '02, category two, 20-hour interrogations. The interrogation days were typically seven-hour interrogations, a new set of interrogators come in, seven hours interrogation, a new set would come in, six hours, and then the detainee was released for four hours. He could sleep if he chose to sleep. Slide 19, and this is the discussion, not a finding, on the ISN- 063. While taken individually, each technique and the application of those techniques was authorized and did not rise to the level, in our judgment, of inhumane treatment. And this A.R. 15-6 found that the cumulative effect of the interrogation was degrading and abusive; again, regarding this particular single individual. Particularly troubling is the combined impact of the 160 days of segregation of the detainees, 48 of 54 consecutive days of 18- to 20- hour interrogations, and the creative application of authorized interrogation techniques. Requiring the subject of the first special interrogation plan to be led around by a leash tied to chains, placing a thong on his head, wearing a bra, insulting his mother and sister, being forced to stand naked in front of a female interrogator for a period of at least five minutes, using strip searches as an interrogation technique the A.R. 15-6 team found to be abusive and degrading, particularly done within the context of the 48 days of intense and long interrogations. I do not, however, consider this treatment to have crossed the threshold of being inhumane. In making that conclusion, I considered the president's mandate to treat the detainees humanely and the requirement to ensure detainees had adequate food, drinking water, clothing, shelter and medical treatment. In this case, the treatment was not determined by me to be inhumane because the interrogators not only ensured that ISN-063 had adequate food, water, clothing and shelter, but also that his interrogation and the techniques used were done in a highly controlled interrogation environment with medical personnel continuously monitoring his health and well-being.

SCHMIDT: On the other hand, despite the controlled environment of the interrogation room, we felt the commander of the joint task force still failed to monitor the cumulative application of the creative interrogation techniques applied over a lengthy period of time. In interviews, the commander of the joint task force stated he was unaware of almost any of these applications. Both Field Manual 3452 and the current secretary of defense guidance warn interrogators of the responsibility to monitor the cumulative effects of interrogation. General Miller was aware of the field manual's warning and had been expressly told by FBI agents of their concerns about the dangers of counter-resistance interrogations. Despite these facts, in my opinion, he failed to monitor and place limits on the application of authorized interrogation techniques -- authorized interrogation techniques -- and allowed this interrogation to result in potentially unnecessary and degrading abusive treatment. On slide 20, we will have to move to a closed hearing to discuss the second high-value detainee. But we will discuss in open session some of the treatment. Slide 21: The second high-value detainee substantiated findings: the first two have asterisks, again reminding that these were observed by the FBI agents as alleged abuse. The DOD interrogator impersonated a Navy captain assigned to the White House. That impersonation was authorized under Field Manual 3452 as a deception approach. Interrogators adjusted air conditioners to make the rooms uncomfortable. Again, not authorized prior to December. However, authorized by the secretary of defense 16 April '03 memo, "environmental manipulation as approved as appropriate humane interrogation techniques." On C, this is one that was found by discovery, and that was that a United States Navy lieutenant commander communicated a threat to the second high-value detainee and his family, and that was determined to be a threat of death. We made a recommendation that the United States Navy lieutenant commander had violated the UCMJ Article 134 by committing a threat, and we recommended discipline by his current commander. We were unable -- again, this is not a legal, criminal investigation by us; we did not have that authority. But the preponderance of evidence, even in the absence of several key witnesses who declined to be interviewed, we found a preponderance of evidence that showed that this did, in fact, happen. SCHMIDT: Slide 22. WARNER: Let me get that clear: Several key witnesses declined to be interviewed?

SCHMIDT: That's correct, sir.

WARNER: Can you amplify that? Who were they and what procedures did you take to try and get those interviews? And did you go above your own level to a higher level to try and get assistance to get those people?

SCHMIDT: Sir, the higher level would, obviously, be the combatant commander, and that will go to General Craddock and he will address that in his remarks. The people who would not acquiesce to being interviewed in this -- and we could not interview them because they were civilian, they were retired or they are reservist; if they were military, we could direct them to participate and cooperate with the investigation -- one was a CIA individual -- and I need to make sure I'm correct on this -- one was a staff judge advocate who said he would plead his rights to not get involved in this and we did not have the authority to go around that, and another one was a -- and a lieutenant commander would also not participate in this interview.

WARNER: Did any FBI personnel decline to be interviewed?

SCHMIDT: No, sir.

LEVIN: Excuse me, was the lieutenant commander on active duty or retired?

SCHMIDT: The lieutenant commander was a reservist and I believe he is no longer even on reserve status. Is that correct? He still in the reserves. He has invoked his rights, and he will have to be interviewed in the investigation that will follow this. Now, I have recommended, again, that this goes to a commander.

LEVIN: Just clarify "invoked his rights." Be more specific: What rights...

SCHMIDT: He invoked his rights to not incriminate himself or participate in the interview.

WARNER: And there will be a follow-on criminal investigation, is that correct? Did you bring that out to General Craddock?

SCHMIDT: I believe so, sir. Sir, we get to slide 22, and again, I apologize for the long-winded and the level of definition, but again to review that we had nine FBI allegations, two unsubstantiated, two were substantiated that were not authorized, and there were five substantiated, however, upon investigation we found that under broad authorities, they were authorized. In my judgment, and we looked at this very, very carefully, no torture occurred. Detention interrogation operations across the board, general population and, again, looking through all the evidence that we could, were safe, secure and humane.

SCHMIDT: We did find that, regarding one detainee, ISN-063, I felt that the cumulative effect of simultaneous applications of numerous authorized techniques had an abusive and degrading impact on the detainee. And, lastly, the second high-value detainee, the naval commander violated UCMJ by communicating a threat. And to us it was a death threat, and that can be determined once we have more testimony under oath to that.

WARNER: Is there any conflict between the two substantiated and not authorized and no torture occurred at all?

SCHMIDT: I'm sorry, could you restate the question?

WARNER: I'm just trying to figure out -- two substantiated, not authorized, and then your general conclusion is there was no torture. Detention or interrogation was safe and secure.

SCHMIDT: Sir, we made a distinction between what torture and inhumane treatment would be, given the general guidelines, and then what might be abusive and degrading. Something might be degrading but not necessarily torture. And it may not be inhumane. It may be humiliating, but it may not be torture. So we can say no torture, no physical pain injury. There was a safe, secure environment the entire time. However, there was degrading and abusive treatment to this particular individual. And that was our charter was to find that. On the next slide, sir, that's the end. And, again, I apologize for the lengthy...

WARNER: You don't need any apologies. This is a very important subject, and we need to have all the details before us.

SCHMIDT: Sir, at this time, I'd like to return the mike to General Craddock.

WARNER: Thank you. General Furlow -- is he going to participate in the direct presentation?

CRADDOCK: No, sir. He's available to answer questions when we get to that stage.

WARNER: All right.

CRADDOCK: Under Army Regulation 15-6, as the appointing authority for the investigation, my responsibility was to review the report and take action on the findings and recommendations. In taking my action, I accepted or approved all the numbered findings and recommendations included in the written report which was provided to the committee with the following two exceptions. I disapproved recommendation number 16, that Major General Miller be held accountable for failing to supervise the interrogation of ISN- 063 and be admonished for that failure. However, in accordance with current procedures and regulations, I have forwarded this report to the Department of the Army inspector general for review and action as he deems appropriate. I modified recommendation number 22 to request that the Naval Criminal Investigative Service conduct further investigation into the threat communicated by an interrogator to a particular high-value detainee before forwarding the matter to the current commander of that interrogator for his action as he deems appropriate. I will now explain the rationale for my decisions. My reason for disapproving recommendation number 16 is that the interrogations...

WARNER: That's relating to General Miller; for those trying to follow this, it's a little difficult to...

CRADDOCK: With regard to Major General Miller, in recommendation number 16, my reason for disapproving that recommendation is that the interrogation of ISN-063 did not result in any violation of a U.S. law or policy, and the degree of supervision provided by Major General Miller does not warrant admonishment under the circumstances. As the commander, even in the early days of his assignment, General Miller was responsible for the conduct of his subordinates. However, as all commanders must do to an extent they determine appropriate, General Miller relied on the judgment and experience of his people to carry out their duties in a manner that was both professional and authorized.

CRADDOCK: The evidence shows that he was not misguided in this trust, since there was no finding that law or policy was violated. General Miller did supervise the interrogation, in that he was aware of the most serious aspects of ISN-063's interrogation, the length of interrogation sessions, the number of days over which it was conducted and the length of segregation from other detainees. The evidence does show that General Miller was not aware of certain other aspects of that interrogation. However, since there was no finding that U.S. law or policy was violated, there is nothing for which to hold him accountable concerning the interrogation of ISN-063. Therefore, under the circumstances, I do not believe that those aspects of which he was not aware warrant disciplinary action. Again, of particular importance to my decision is the fact there was no finding that the interrogation of ISN-063, albeit characterized as creative, aggressive and persistent, violated U.S. law or policy. Additionally, I think it's important to note that General Miller arrived in Gitmo for the first time when he assumed command on 4 November 2002. He's an artilleryman with no previous command experience in detention and strategic intelligence-gathering operations. Upon arrival, he assumed command of two organizations, Joint Task Force 160 and 170, that upon his arrival were merged into Joint Task Force Gitmo. The operations at Gitmo had commenced in January 2002 with little infrastructure in place when the first detainees arrived. Upon assuming command of Joint Task Force Gitmo, General Miller became responsible for a multitude of tasks that demanded his immediate attention: merging the two task forces into one task force that would have a common operating system for both the interrogation element and the detention element; managing the construction of new facilities, and the manning, equipping, training and organizing of the force; developing standard operating procedures for and improving the cooperation between interagency interrogations; and also, last but not least, improving the quality of life for the military personnel of Joint Task Force Gitmo. Now, let me go on to the next recommendation, recommendation 22, which has to deal with the communication of a threat. My reason for modifying recommendation 22 is that further investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service...

WARNER: Before we leave Miller now, because your decision, in effect, reverses General Schmidt's finding, but your decision is now to be reviewed by the inspector general of the Department of the Army. That should be put in the record at this point.

CRADDOCK: That's correct, Senator. The requirement I have under Army regulations, the Army requirement actually, is that any allegation of wrongdoing, founded or unfounded, must be communicated to the inspector general of the Department of Army for his review and decision as appropriate.

WARNER: Will he review this de novo, in other words, go from the ground up, look at it all?

CRADDOCK: We send him the report and my forwarded letter for his review.

WARNER: And then it goes to the secretary of the Army, I presume.

CRADDOCK: Mr. Chairman, what he does with it, I don't know his procedures.

WARNER: All right.

LEVIN: Does he have the power to reverse your reversal of those two recommendations?

CRADDOCK: I don't know.

WARNER: I think he does.

LEVIN: General Craddock, your answer is that you don't know if he has that power?

CRADDOCK: That's correct.

LEVIN: I think we ought to ask our counsel about that.

WARNER: We'll verify.

CRADDOCK: Now, with regard to the communication of the threat, my reason for modifying recommendation 22 is that further investigation by Naval Criminal Investigative Service may discover evidence in mitigation and extenuation that should be considered in determining whether disciplinary action is appropriate for the interrogator. But the recommendations I approved -- recommendations 23 to 27 -- are not within my authority to implement, therefore I forwarded those to the deputy assistant secretary of defense for detainee affairs for review and action as he deems appropriate. This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity and we stand ready to answer your questions.

WARNER: Thank you very much. First, I want to commend you, General Schmidt, working with General Furlow, on what appears to be a very comprehensive and thorough piece of work by you and your team. We had to move swiftly on this. I had the opportunity at length to visit with General Craddock last night and to, in the intervening hours, move through much of the report. But it's a complicated subject. And my first question I'll put to General Craddock, but I think in all likelihood you'll want to refer it to your two officers. And that is, your assessment of the working relationship between those in the bureau -- there was some -- what? -- 400 or 500 bureau people that...

SCHMIDT: Sir, there were 493 in the e-mail survey, and obviously there's more since.

WARNER: Right. My understanding, they came for 30-day intervals -- the individual. Is that about right?

SCHMIDT: I think there were -- 30 to 45 days was the standard.

WARNER: Very brief intervals they were there. And then it was a complete recycling, one after another.

WARNER: And that's in sharp contrast to the military individual or the civilians who were there for at least a year in many instances. Am I correct on that?

CRADDOCK: Initially six months and then it turned into a year rotation, yes, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Now, the interrogation at Gitmo it is clear was producing a lot of very important intelligence that helped our operating forces, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is thoroughly documented, General Craddock?

CRADDOCK: Mr. Chairman, during the closed session we will provide you information on the intelligence gained, yes, sir.

WARNER: But my assessment I think in open can be that it was a very important contribution...

CRADDOCK: Yes, sir.

WARNER: ... to save lives, be it Americans or coalition forces, fighting in those.

CRADDOCK: We believe so.

WARNER: Right. And the findings by and large, with the several exceptions that you've pointed out, indicate that the interrogating procedures were conducted in accordance with directives from the secretary of defense, even though from time to time they were changed. Now, the bureau people were looking at this same set of facts coming from these detainees and the procedures from the perspective of future criminal operations in the United States. Am I correct on that?

CRADDOCK: Mr. Chairman, that's correct. The FBI agent went down there with the idea of conducting a prosecutable case in a court of law.

WARNER: Fine. And the standards by which they collect evidence for prosecutions, presumably for federal courts as opposed to state, were quite different than the standards promulgated by the secretary of defense. Am I correct in that observation?

CRADDOCK: Yes, sir, that's correct.

WARNER: And to put it in simple ways, that it seems to me could put sand in the gearbox and cause some difficulty in their pursuing their mission and the military pursuing their mission. Am I correct in that, General?

SCHMIDT: That's correct, sir.

WARNER: When you conducted your investigation, to what extent did the bureau have the opportunity to look at your findings, preliminary, and provide some rebuttal?

SCHMIDT: Sir, when we started the investigation, they were aware that the entire focus of my investigation, General Furlow's investigation, was centered around their alleged perception or otherwise aggressive tactics for interrogation that they would violate their own policy.

SCHMIDT: They gave us access...

WARNER: So in other words SecDef's directives were inconsistent -- maybe not in violation, but inconsistent with their policies. Is that correct?

SCHMIDT: The goals are different. The goals for evidence to be used in court...

WARNER: Yes, I understand the goals...

SCHMIDT: ... and intelligence to be used drove us that way. So there were different rules. The agents on the ground, obviously, wanted to develop rapport and develop evidence through non-coercive means because it's no longer admissible in a court of law. We needed actionable intelligence on the Department of Defense side and: one, time was an element; two, the coercion piece was not an element that would deter that.

WARNER: Now, clearly, that gave rise to some of the agents providing the -- what is it? -- 28 e-mails. Is that the number?

SCHMIDT: Yes, sir.

WARNER: That raised allegations which gave...

CRADDOCK: Twenty-six.

WARNER: Twenty-six? Twenty-six e-mails which gave rise to the need for General Craddock to convene this thing. Now, to what extent did the writers of those e-mails have an understanding with what the military mission was versus what the bureau mission was? Presumably, they understood what the bureau mission was and the constraints, as you say, imposed by our doctrine of federal law and criminal procedure. But did they have appreciation for what you were trying to do in accordance with SecDef?

SCHMIDT: Sir, I'll turn this over to General Furlow. But, obviously, five of their allegations were unsubstantiated because they didn't have an understanding. What they saw and what they understood to be abusive didn't correlate.

WARNER: General Furlow, do you want to...

FURLOW: Yes, sir, I could comment. I'd like to make a comment that the bureau was very cooperative in working with us on this investigation. And the goals, obviously, as you mentioned previously, were different. Now, the initial conversation with some of the writers of the electronic communications were from a standpoint of providing a prosecution. Later on, late 2002, early 2003, there was more of an understanding and communication between the DOD representatives and the bureau individuals about what each individual's part of the effort at Gitmo was.

WARNER: Now, my understanding is that the director of the bureau has this whole chapter or problem under investigation. Is that correct, General Craddock?

CRADDOCK: Mr. Chairman, I know that the Department of Justice inspector general requested to visit Guantanamo to interview their people there and some of the DOD people. We supported that. They also did some interviewing of detainees. Beyond that, I am not aware of where that investigation is going nor the intent or purpose. What we were told was to validate FBI processes and reporting procedures.

WARNER: Were there any instances in the performance of your mission pursuant to General Craddock's order in which you felt that the bureau was not being cooperative? In other words, did each of the persons you wish to interview agreed to do it and did perform an interview?

SCHMIDT: When I came on, they were completely cooperative. They were collaborative. The Department of Justice -- they were just beginning their investigation as we were ending ours. General Furlow had constant contact with the FBI agents, and they also worked with the FBI to have access to all of those agents who had allegations that they had seen abuse. General Furlow?

FURLOW: Yes, sir, we worked hand-in-hand with the FBI. There were some agents that were just not available based on the fact that they were deployed overseas and on projects and such like that. We were able to visit with the FBI through the FBI legal -- well, we were allowed to run the lead with their representatives from the DOJ I.G. in attendance. And we've been in communication with their investigation to ensure that they have the information that we were able to obtain to assist them in their investigation.

WARNER: Well, now, the two unsubstantiated e-mails -- did you interview both of the writers of those e-mails?

FURLOW: Sir, the two unsubstantiated allegations -- we actually...

WARNER: In other words, to me, those e-mails were examined by you and you could not find any facts to substantiate the allegations in those two FBI e-mails. Is that what that means?

FURLOW: Yes, sir. In addition to that, what we did is we queried each one of the FBI agents we visited with with all of the eight or nine allegations that I was initially chartered with.

WARNER: Correct. But now, the two unsubstantiated, were those people face-to-face interviewed by you or your staff?

FURLOW: Sir, there was a few -- one individual agent was not available who wrote one of the electronic communications. We were not able to get a hold of her.

FURLOW: She was not available. But we were able to...

WARNER: What's "not available" mean? She's locatable somewhere in the world, isn't she?

FURLOW: Yes, sir. She was on a project.

WARNER: Whatever. I don't want to probe behind what may be classified, but presumably they're detained to domestic stations here in CONUS. I suppose, may be overseas?

FURLOW: Yes, sir. There's a considerable number of bureau folks deployed overseas.

WARNER: I understand that. But I mean -- where was this individual physically?

FURLOW: Could I defer that to the -- I'm not sure where the limits of the line is with FBI information. If I could defer that to the classified setting.

WARNER: Well, anyway, let's put it this way: It's so important that we determine how these reports were put together given that the facts did not exist, in your judgment, to support them.

FURLOW: Yes, sir.

WARNER: And it seems to me that we should have delegated someone to go somewhere and face-to-face interrogate that agent. Was that procedure considered.

FURLOW: Yes, sir. It was considered, but it was not done. But, in the context of those allegations, through review in the methodology, reviewing the logs, interviewing other FBI agents and DOD personnel, we were not able to substantiate those two allegations.

WARNER: Well, in my judgment -- and I have some experience dealing with this as an assistant U.S. attorney one time -- you go find the person wherever that person is and face-to-face query them. But that was not done for some reason, is that correct?

FURLOW: With one individual, that's correct, sir.

WARNER: But that was an important individual, am I not correct?

FURLOW: Yes, sir.

WARNER: All right. Is it possible, General Craddock, that there could be a follow-up to fill that gap?

CRADDOCK: Yes, Mr. Chairman. We can pursue that.

WARNER: All right. I thank you. Senator Levin?

LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Craddock, you say there's basically three different types of activity here you distinguish between relative to the Miller recommendation. One was torture, one is inhumane treatment and the other one is degrading and abusive treatment. That, I believe -- maybe General Schmidt made those distinctions. And, when it came to the recommendation relative to General Miller, you said that there was no U.S. policy that was violated and that was the reason for your decision. Is degrading or abusive treatment consistent with U.S. policy?

CRADDOCK: Senator, in the context of the interrogation techniques authorized -- the broad level, F.M. 3452 and the directives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense -- those techniques were very general in nature.

CRADDOCK: Now, what happens is they're then at Joint Task Force Guantanamo, the interrogation team looks at, for example, pride and ego down or futility, as was the example used by General Smith, and they develop specific applications, if you will, how to then use, under that large interrogation techniques, specific applications which will cause discomfort to the detainee, which will break concentration, which will take that detainee out of his trained resistance techniques. They may be, as General Smith has said, have a cumulative effect of being abusive or degrading.

LEVIN: You said "may be." Did you disagree with General Schmidt's conclusion that there were degrading and abusive techniques used here?

CRADDOCK: His conclusion was cumulative effects...

LEVIN: Cumulative. Did you disagree...

CRADDOCK: I don't know because the report -- my investigators did not give me the point at which that would have occurred. Was it a combination of techniques occurring at the same time or was there a combination of one technique over time or both? I don't know. That is the reason...

LEVIN: You're saying you don't know from their report...

CRADDOCK: Correct.

LEVIN: You don't agree or disagree with their conclusion that the cumulative effect was degrading and abusive technique.

CRADDOCK: It may well be the case but their report did not prove it conclusively for me.

LEVIN: If it were the case, would you agree that that would violate U.S. policy?

CRADDOCK: No.

LEVIN: OK. It would make no difference whether or not the report is clear on that point or not because even if it is clear on that point, which it is in my judgment, it's still, in your judgment...

CRADDOCK: Did I do what now?

LEVIN: If you agreed with their conclusion that the cumulative effect of these actions was that there were, in their words, degrading and abusive treatment of detainees, would you agree that that would violate U.S. policy?

CRADDOCK: The policy as written, I would disagree that it would not violate... LEVIN: No, no. "Disagree that it would not" -- there's a double negative.

CRADDOCK: That's correct.

LEVIN: In your judgment, if the cumulative effect of treatment of detainees resulted in degrading and abusive treatment, would that violate U.S. policy? Can you give a yes, no or you don't know?

CRADDOCK: For this specific detainee, which is the only one I can address, since it's the only one in question... LEVIN: There are two.

CRADDOCK: ... with regard to those techniques...

LEVIN: There's two here.

CRADDOCK: This is the only one, sir, with these techniques that we addressed. Because of the situation -- now, let's take a step back.

LEVIN: I don't want to disagree with you. I just want to find out what your answer is. In your judgment, do you disagree with their conclusion that, relative to that detainee, the cumulative effect of the behavior of the interrogators was degrading and abusive treatment? Do you disagree with their conclusion or -- do you disagree with that conclusion?

CRADDOCK: I don't know.

LEVIN: OK.

CRADDOCK: I stated earlier because they didn't give me the specificity.

LEVIN: OK. Next question: If you agreed with the conclusion would you then believe that that would violate U.S. policy?

CRADDOCK: We're dealing in hypotheticals?

LEVIN: Yes.

CRADDOCK: I don't want to do that.

LEVIN: OK.

CRADDOCK: We're dealing in specifics here.

LEVIN: OK.

CRADDOCK: I think that's why, sir, as I tried to state -- and let me just -- that's what I agreed to the recommendation. This needs some further study to determine where points are, as referenced in the report, and where lines may be crossed.

LEVIN: OK. General Schmidt, let me ask you a question. On May 10th, 2004 -- by the way, let me just tell you, General Craddock, I would have hoped that you could have given us a good, clear "yes"; that if you concluded -- if you concluded -- that there was degrading and abusive treatment of a detainee, that that would violate U.S. policy. I would have hoped you would have given us a good clear "yes" on that, but I'll leave it at that.

CRADDOCK: May I respond?

LEVIN: Sure, if you're going to leave me a little time.

CRADDOCK: Senator, we have some definitional standards and we know what torture is and we know what cruelty is. And inhumane treatment is undefined, but defined at Joint Task Force Guantanamo. So in the absence of anything else that's used, it appears to be effective. Beyond that, this blurs. And an intent -- the issue here is to: What was the reason it might have been done? It was to produce an effect: to gain information; not for recreation.

LEVIN: Right. I couldn't agree with you more on that. May 10th, 2004 -- General Schmidt, this is for you -- in a May 10th, 2004, e-mail released under a FOIA request describes how FBI concerns about aggressive DOD interrogation techniques were so serious that agents in Guantanamo had guidance to stand clear when the techniques were used. The e-mail states that in weekly meetings officials from the FBI and the Justice Department's Criminal Division, quote, "We all agreed: DOD tactics were going to be an issue in military commissioned cases." Now my question: Do you have an unredacted copy of the May 10th, 2004, e-mail?

SCHMIDT: Sir, I am familiar with the e-mail. I am not sure if we have an unredacted copy or not.

LEVIN: Well, I would think you should have an unredacted copy of the e-mail. I think you ought to insist...

SCHMIDT: We'll take that for the record and we will find out.

LEVIN: But if you don't, I think you ought to insist upon it. And there was, finally, in this May 10th, 2004, document, a reference to an earlier electronic communication which was prepared by the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit explaining the bureau way of interrogation versus DOD's methodology. A classified version of that E.C. -- OK, that's a classified version of the E.C. which was referred to in the May 10th, 2004, document -- a classified version of that E.C., which is dated on May 30th, 2003, has been provided to the Senate by the FBI.

LEVIN: The classified May 30th, 2000, E.C. contains a number of redactions but also makes reference to a number of attachments to the May 30th, 2003, E.C. My question: Do you have an unredacted copy of the May 30th, 2003 electronic communication and do you have the attachments that are referred to?

SCHMIDT: Senator, we're not in possession of that. We are aware of that E.C. We were made aware of it in these last few days. We were allowed to see and review but not take possession of that document by the FBI just two days ago.

LEVIN: And its attachments?

SCHMIDT: General Furlow, did you get to see the attachments?

FURLOW: Yes, sir.

LEVIN: I would ask the chairman here that we ask that you make available to us in a classified setting, and that the FBI make available to us, since you folks have seen them, that document, plus its attachments, in a classified setting. So this is really a question I guess I'll have to address to our chairman rather than...

WARNER: We'll take it under advisement.

LEVIN: Thank you. My time is up.

WARNER: But I believe we've got to clarify the record. Your questions are very important. In the course of your examination of the e-mails, did you see all of the unredacted that you so desired?

SCHMIDT: General Furlow, did that part of the investigation.

FURLOW: In going back to Senator Levin's comment earlier, sir, is that we reviewed those yesterday at the FBI headquarters. We were able to review them and read them. But we were not allowed to take possession of those documents. We were allowed to take notes but we do not have those documents in our possession.

WARNER: And your report was written before you saw those documents?

FURLOW: Yes, sir.

SCHMIDT: And, sir, our judgment after General Furlow read that was determined it was not relevant to the focus of our investigation on abuse; this particular focus.

LEVIN: That's fine. If we could have a full copy of those documents in our classified session, it would be helpful.

CRADDOCK: Senator, we don't have the documents.

WARNER: No, I understand. We'll have to -- why did you delay until 24 hours before this hearing to look at such an important body of evidentiary material?

FURLOW: Sir, there was one particular document that came up. We were able to obtain a copy. There was a reference to this document dated May 30th, 2003, and that was a specific document that I had not seen before.

FURLOW: The other referenced documentation that I reviewed yesterday, the attachments and such, were made privileged to us previous to that. And what I did is I went through and reviewed those to ensure that we had a completeness. But the only document that we had not seen previous was the May 30th, 2003.

LEVIN: So the attachments had been made available to you?

FURLOW: Yes, sir.

LEVIN: OK, good. I thank you.

WARNER: Senator McCain?

MCCAIN: General Craddock, just a matter of curiosity: You mentioned of the reasons why you overruled General Schmidt's recommendations, General Miller was an artilleryman and had absolutely no experience in the handling of prisoners. Why, if this is such a valuable and important operation, would we appoint somebody in charge who had no experience?

CRADDOCK: Senator, as I recall, I said his experience in detention operations at the strategic level. I didn't make that decision. General Miller is an aggressive commander. He is known to be able to work through problems and bring...

(CROSSTALK)

MCCAIN: So we couldn't find anybody who had background and experience in this kind of work to be in charge? CRADDOCK: No, I can't answer that. I wasn't privy to the selection process.

MCCAIN: The prisoners at Guantanamo are those captured in Afghanistan, is that correct?

CRADDOCK: That's correct.

MCCAIN: And what is the status of those prisoners? What's the official status of those prisoners?

CRADDOCK: As determined by the combatant status review tribunals, enemy combatants or no longer enemy combatants.

MCCAIN: Either one?

CRADDOCK: The ones that are declared no longer enemy combatants then will either be returned to country of origin or released as an ongoing process, Senator.

MCCAIN: I was asking the status of those who are held prisoner today in Guantanamo. What is their official status?

CRADDOCK: I answered that question, sir.

MCCAIN: Which is?

CRADDOCK: They are either enemy combatants, as determined by the combatant status review tribunal and validated through an annual review board, or no longer enemy combatants and therefore they'll be processed for return or release.

MCCAIN: As enemy combatants, what protections and what international agreements that we're signatories to are they entitled to?

CRADDOCK: Our policy is they will be treated humanely and, where military necessity is allowed, consistent with the principles of the Geneva Convention.

MCCAIN: Say that again.

CRADDOCK: They will be treated humanely and, where military necessity permits, consistent with the principles of Geneva Convention.

MCCAIN: "Where military necessity permits" they are then eligible for the Geneva Conventions? Who decides where military necessity permits?

CRADDOCK: Consistent with military necessity... MCCAIN: Who decides what military necessity is?

CRADDOCK: At this point, sir, the JTF commander, JTF-Gitmo commander. 

MCCAIN: So when we interrogate a prisoner, we say, "You may be eligible for protections under the Geneva Conventions, but only where military necessity permits"?

CRADDOCK: I didn't indicate it was an interrogation issue. The point at which...

MCCAIN: We're talking about interrogation at this hearing, General.

CRADDOCK: I understand that, Senator, but there's also detainee operations, which is the security aspect of that.

MCCAIN: Let's focus our attention on the interrogation techniques which are the subject of this hearing.

CRADDOCK: OK.

MCCAIN: Who decides whether they have the protection of the Geneva Conventions for the treatment of prisoners of war or not?

CRADDOCK: That is a presidential decision. The president has said that they do not have protection of the Geneva Conventions.

MCCAIN: Even though they are classified as enemy combatants?

CRADDOCK: Sir, the president has said they do not have protection of the Geneva Conventions.

MCCAIN: These are not Al Qaida. These are people who are captured in combat in Afghanistan, is that right?

CRADDOCK: They are Taliban and Al Qaida.

MCCAIN: OK. And they were part of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, right?

CRADDOCK: They were the Taliban. Whether it was the Taliban government, I won't judge. They were Taliban.

MCCAIN: OK. So basically, they have no protections unless military necessity permits it, is that correct?

CRADDOCK: They will be treated humanely.

MCCAIN: Tell me this: At least for a period of time, is it still permissible to use a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation?

CRADDOCK: I'm sorry, Senator, I missed the question. I was given a note here.

MCCAIN: I have the JTF 170 counter-resistance techniques requested 11 October. SecDef approved 2 December, Cat-2 and Cat-3 rescinded 15 January. Is it still permissible to use a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation?

CRADDOCK: Sir, the only interrogation techniques authorized are in the 16 April letter. I don't know the date of that letter, if that was the 2 December, tier one, two and one of tier three. Tier two and one individual technique and tier three were rescinded on 15, January.

MCCAIN: All of them?

CRADDOCK: All tier two and all of tier three. Only one was every authorized in tier three.

SCHMIDT: Senator McCain, if I could answer that...

MCCAIN: Go ahead.

SCHMIDT: ... on that list, the use of the wet towel, dripping water to induce misperception of suffocation was one of the techniques requested by JTF in their laundry list given up. It was never approved. It has never been a technique approved. The secretary of defense declined even to consider that.

MCCAIN: That was a tier three?

CHMIDT: It was a category three request that was never approved.

MCCAIN: Are dogs still used in used in interrogations?

CRADDOCK: Dogs are not used in interrogations.

MCCAIN: They are not?

CRADDOCK: No, sir.

MCCAIN: They have been?

CRADDOCK: I believe the report has indicated -- found two occasions where dogs were used.

MCCAIN: General Schmidt, there's a -- well, let me just tell you the problem, General Craddock. There is no specific guidelines, that I can tell from your response, for specific rules for treatment of, quote, "enemy combatants." And there needs to be. Maybe that's not in your pay grade, but the clause "where military necessity permits" is as wide open as anything that I have ever heard. And this is what leads to recommendations such as were agreed to by the sec def and then had to be rescinded. And I also happen to know that the then-acting -- on active duty -- judge advocate generals did not agree with these guidelines that were approved by the secretary of defense for a short period of time.

CRADDOCK: Sir, may I clarify...

MCCAIN: We need specific rules and specific guidelines for the treatment of, quote, "enemy combatants" as these in Guantanamo are. Now, they may be Al Qaida, they may be Taliban, they may be the worst people in the world -- and I'm sure that some of them are -- but there are certain basic rules and international agreements that the United States has agreed to, that we will observe. You go ahead and please respond -- you wanted...

CRADDOCK: Just something very quickly. Let me clarify. The president's policy: As a matter of policy, the United States armed forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

MCCAIN: You know, when you say you adhere to some principles, lots of us adhere to principles and practices, then vary -- rather dramatically. And, as I say, that is a legalistic statement and one that is ridden with loopholes. And it's clear to me that one of the reasons why we're sitting here today was, at least at the working level, the interrogators did not understand -- at least some of them did not understand -- that, quote, "humane treatment" might be in the eye of the beholder. General Schmidt, did you draw that conclusion from your investigation?

SCHMIDT: Sir, the lines were hard to define. Humane treatment, torture I felt were the clear lines. So did the joint task force. Anything else beyond that was fairly vague.

SCHMIDT: So it fell to our judgment. And, again, this was not a criminal investigation. It was one where I was asked to use my judgment. Detainee abuse was the center of the investigation. I felt there were abusive and degrading things done to this particular detainee and that's why I made that judgment.

MCCAIN: General Furlow, the Army Field Manual is very specific, is it not on the treatment of prisoners?

FURLOW: Yes, sir, 3452 is specific on the -- there's a chart on 1-10.

MCCAIN: Why would we not just say: The Army field manual applies here with an exception, if the president of the United States decided that the Army Field Manual could be exceeded in outstanding examples? What's wrong with just using the Army Field Manual which is what we have used in previous conflicts?

FURLOW: Yes, sir. That's essentially what was done. The initial one is set up at Gitmo. The 3452 was the authority. And the commander on the ground determined that it did not meet his requirement and requested more aggressive interrogation techniques and requested through memo form, in written form, and that's where the December 2nd memo comes from that was later rescinded on the 15th of January. And then it followed the next authority process, sir.

MCCAIN: And I might add that those guidelines that were approved by sec def were not agreed to by the uniformed judge advocate generals because of their concern that we would get into this kind of morass that I find us in now. It's not clear to this member of this committee and I don't think it's clear to the American people exactly and specifically what the guidelines are which then understandably would lead to some abuses of prisoners. I hold no brief for the prisoners. I do hold a brief for the reputation of the United States of America as to adhering to certain standards of treatment of people no matter how evil or terrible they may be. And I'm afraid, General Craddock, that you haven't -- this hearing hasn't cleared that up, at least, to my satisfaction. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do you want to respond to that, General Craddock?

CRADDOCK: I understand the point you've made.

MCCAIN: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator McCain. That request up to higher authority, do we have documents that reflect how that was put to the higher authority? If not, we'd like to have that made a part of the record.

FURLOW: Yes, sir. We made note of that earlier that that's part of the fact chain that we're providing to you in documentation with the 2, December memo.

WARNER: Because it's an important line of questioning and we really have got to probe this very, very carefully. Senator Reed?

REED: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Schmidt, that page 12, I just want to try to clarify something in my own mind. You cite FM-3452. You take out (inaudible) General Craddock as you go down.

REED: And then you give an application at Gitmo which has mother and sister were whores, dancing with male interrogators, homosexuality allegations, et cetera. First point, that sounds remarkably similar to what occurred at Abu Ghraib, people being led around in chains, people being forced to wear lingerie. Perhaps coincidence, perhaps not. But to clarify this, is it your assertion that FM-3452, which is written in the context of the Geneva Convention, would allow this type of behavior at any place other than Gitmo because...

SCHMIDT: Under the Geneva Convention, sexual humiliation would not be appropriate.

REED: So these references to 3452, which are written in the context of the Geneva Convention, that cited Geneva Conventions are not at all applicable in your view, to Guantanamo?

SCHMIDT: The enemy combatants in this context are also not applicable to the Geneva Convention.

REED: So the confusion, I think, here is that there are standards which we have to apply under the Geneva Convention which is in Iraq particularly, but the answer here was we were operating essentially with just the direction of secretary of defense and whatever the improvisations that could be made down there at Guantanamo. Is that fair?

SCHMIDT: Senator, what would be fair is there were authorized techniques and the application to someone with a status that was not protected by the Geneva Convention although he had to maintain humane treatment. We're taking a fairly good look at it.

REED: I'll just turn to ISN-063. The 20th hijacker, probably the most infamous, notorious prisoner down there: What approvals were necessary from the Department of Defense to conduct this interrogation of ISN-063?

SCHMIDT: The approval process was one where the request to interrogate him was done by the JTF. Those procedures that came down, there was considerable amount of debate, conferencing, meetings and that sort of thing. And then there was an offering of how many might be suitable. And in the end, the secretary of defense chose a lesser number and promulgated those down to December.

REED: No, but I'm talking specifically about this one prisoner.

SCHMIDT: He was the subject of the request.

REED: All right. So we have, with respect to this one prisoner, an ongoing dialogue between General Miller, authorities in the Defense Department, including the secretary of defense, about specific techniques that were going to be used, specific parameters for the investigation. Is that correct?

SCHMIDT: To our knowledge, there was considerable amount of communication up and down the chain. That was not the subject of our investigation.

REED: But you are aware of numerous communications between General Miller and Secretary Rumsfeld and other civilians in the Defense Department specifically about this one prisoner?

SCHMIDT: We were aware there was communication...

FURLOW: Let me set the record straight here if I could, Senator. This special interrogation proposal was developed prior to General Miller coming on board. It was done by General Dunleavy. And the preparation was weeks before General Miller showed up. REED: When did the -- excuse me, General -- when did the interrogations take place with INS-063? Throughout General Miller's tenure? How many months?

SCHMIDT: Prior to his arrival in -- and then he arrived while it was already ongoing. It started on 23 November.

REED: Have you been able to -- did you look at General Miller's e-mails in your investigation?

SCHMIDT: We looked at all his promulgated guidance.

REED: But you didn't look at any of his e-mails?

SCHMIDT: Did not see now -- correct me -- do we have...

FURLOW: Sir, let me handle that one. Sir, we went back to the server and the answer is no, we did not look at his e-mails. We attempted to look at it. The server did not contain the e-mails in its memory past about a year, 18 months. So we were able to get a few memos, but they were not applicable to this particular case.

REED: So you couldn't recover, from any sources, the communications he had back and forth about ISN-063?

FURLOW: Not in the e-mail format, sir.

REED: General Craddock, I think what you've done is taken an investigation which was sincere and detailed and turned it into a justification and exoneration for a senior officer, and found a junior officer to recommend for punishment, which is consistent with all these other investigations. General officers apparently are fine. They were overstressed.

REED: They were distracted. They didn't have the background. But Naval Reserve lieutenant commanders are now looking at a punishment. And it seems to me to be ludicrous. This prisoner was not someone lost in the shuffle. He was probably the most significant prisoner in Guantanamo. He was the subject, even though it was with General Dunleavy, of debate with the secretary of defense about precisely what should be done. And for you to exonerate General Miller by simply saying he knew how long it was, but he didn't have to pay attention to details, I think is unsubstantiated by any evidence. In fact the evidence I think would compel following up with General Schmidt's reprimand. So I just, once again, disappointed in an investigation that has turned into something less than accountability. And it's another, again, justification for, I think, terrible mistakes. I associate myself with Senator McCain's remarks -- we're in this hole because no one has taken responsibility at a senior level for what's been done. Thank you.

WARNER: General Craddock, I want to give you or the other witnesses an opportunity to fully reply to the senator's observations.

CRADDOCK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My response is I appreciate the senator's comments. I don't agree, obviously. I looked at this from the perspective of someone with 33 years, plus, experience, trying to put my experience, what I have learned, into that situation, as I always do, when I have to make judgments on admonishment or reprimanding or punishing subordinates or others, I am judged to do so. I looked at that. And the difference between my investigators and myself essentially is the scope of supervision necessary -- and I looked at the fact that he placed trust and confidence in his subordinates. And those subordinates, I think, repaid that trust and confidence there was no crossing of the line, if you will, violating the law or the policies, as they were provided. I think that we've got to understand this notion of interrogation technique as written in 3452 is a broad level, as General Schmidt discussed. And there are different categories. They then become translated into manifestations, into activity, in their application. And I think that's where reasonable people will differ in their expectations of what applications are used. We know, based on this manual, the Al Qaida training manual, we know how they prepare resistance techniques. And if we use interrogation techniques that they are prepared for, they won't work. So the intent there is to get into their space, cause them discomfort, to create a situation where they start to talk and we gain information. And that's where the creativity of the interrogators through proper authorities, as was in place, and still is, was applied. The other fact is, this was one individual. It is not applied universally across the entire detainee population.

REED: Mr. Chairman?

WARNER: Yes, Senator Reed?

REED: Mr. Chairman, may I ask General Craddock, did you read General Schmidt's entire file?

CRADDOCK: His report?

REED: His report.

CRADDOCK: Yes, sir.

REED: The statements?

CRADDOCK: Yes, sir, I read every attachment.

WARNER: Matter of fact, you told me you read it twice last night.

REED: And your conclusion was, as I believe you said, there's not enough detail for you to substantiate the point at which this cumulative effect was contrary to policy.

CRADDOCK: Contrary to policy or crosses the line to something else. I don't know where it is. I asked the question, Senator, of my investigators. I am unsure of where you say the cumulative effect. Is it a multiple application simultaneously of different techniques? Is it one technique over time? Where is the most egregious? I don't know. And that's the basis of my approval of his recommendation.

REED: General, the lines need to be drawn here, and you didn't draw it. WARNER: Thank you very much. I want to make sure that the other flag officers have had a full opportunity to reply. Did you wish to add anything, General Schmidt?

SCHMIDT: No, sir. I respect General Craddock's and General Furlow's opinion.

WARNER: Fine. Senator Inhofe?

INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me give you a different senator's observations. Sometimes we get bogged down in all the detail and we forget about the overall picture, the big picture. And I'm shocked when I found, only yesterday, from the report, that after three years and 24,000 interrogations, only three acts of violation of the approved interrogation techniques authorized by Field Manual 3452 and DOD guidelines. I'm shocked. It makes me wonder if we're really getting the most out of these detainees. They talked about one detainee having duct tape, another red ink and all that stuff. When you contrast these interrogation techniques with those used in other countries, those fighting us, it's hard to understand why we're so wrapped up in this investigation. Further, you have determined in all but a couple of cases appropriate disciplinary action was taken and in all the cases no further incidents occurred. Add to that fact, most, if not all, of these incidents are at least a year old. I'm very impressed with the way the military, the FBI and other agencies have conducted themselves. This report shows me an incredible amount of restraint and discipline was present at Gitmo. Even the small infractions found were found by our own government, corrected and now reported. We have nothing to be ashamed of. What other country attacked as we were would exercise the same degree of self criticism and restraint. Let me ask you, General Furlow, you've been getting off easy here, just give me, in your professional opinion, what is the worst substantiated incidence of inappropriate use of interrogation techniques that you investigated? Just the one.

FURLOW: Sir, in my opinion, and that's solely my opinion, would be the one involving the classified detainee and that fact pattern.

INHOFE: Was appropriate disciplinary action taken in a timely manner in that case?

FURLOW: Sir, that was with our report recommending being passed on to the naval investigation.

INHOFE: OK. And I'd like to ask just for a very brief response. It's something that concerns me and I'd like to have this from each of the witnesses. We've heard a lot about the Field Manual 3452. Are the DOD guidelines, as currently published in that manual, appropriate to allow interrogators to get valuable information, intelligence information, while not crossing the line from interrogation to abuse? Do you think you're too restrained?

INHOFE: What's your opinion?

CRADDOCK: Senator, I think, because that manual was written for enemy prisoners of war, we have a translation problem, in that enemy prisoners are to be treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions -- that doesn't apply. That's why the recommendation was made and I affirmed it. We need a further look here on this new phenomena of enemy combatants. It's different, and we're trying to use, I think, a manual that was written for one reason in another environment.

INHOFE: Yes, thank you. General Schmidt?

SCHMIDT: Sir, I agree. It's critical that we come to grips with not hanging on a Cold War relic of Field Manual 3452, which addressed an entirely different population. If we are, in fact, going to get intelligence to stay ahead of this type of threat, we need to understand what else we can do and still stay in our lane of humane treatment.

INHOFE: Yes, do you agree, General Furlow?

FURLOW: Sir, in echoing that, F.M. 3452 was originally written in 1987, further updated and refined in 1992, which is dealing with the Geneva question as well as an ordered battle enemy, not the enemy that we're facing currently. I'm aware that Fort Huachuca's currently in a rewrite of the next 3452, and it's in a draft form right now.

INHOFE: Thank you, General Furlow, and let me just give my own observations. I think that you're entitled to that, to know that we are different senators and come from different perspectives. I did have occasion to be in the United States Army. I think that was one of the best things that ever happened in my life. But I would maintain that these detainees that we're talking about here -- they're detainees. They have knowledge about terrorist cells and operations that's useful to the United States in understanding the actions of those who seek to do us harm, of destroying our way of life. They are not to be coddled -- not if we are to get access to the information that they possess, and information that will help us defeat them. And that's what this is all about. We're not talking about shoplifters here. We're talking -- I think you stated it very well, General Craddock, when you say, "These are the worst of the worst." And when you see some of the things that have been attributed to -- different people are talking about them -- they are watching what we are saying. And I am really concerned about this. I got a lot of criticism a little over a year ago when it was Abu Ghraib, the first investigations were taking place. And I looked at the facts that those in those cell blocks were the terrorists, were the murderers, were our enemies. And I was more outraged by the outrage than I was by the treatment of those. This is just one senator speaking. What other country would freely discuss interrogation techniques used against high-value intelligence detainees during a time of war when suicide bombers are killing our fellow citizens? Why would we freely explain the limitations placed on our interrogators, when we know that our enemy trains his terrorists in methods to defeat our interrogations? Today, we're handing them new information on how to train future terrorists. What damage are we doing to our war effort by parading these relatively minor infractions before the press and the world again and again and again while our soldiers risk their lives daily and are given no mercy by the enemy?

INHOFE: Our enemies exploit everything we do and everything we say. Al-Zarqawi, the other day, said to his followers, quote, "The Americans are living their worst days in Iraq now. Even members of Congress have announced that the U.S. is losing the war in Iraq." So I just say to you and as one person, I applaud all three of you warriors. I applaud the discipline that has been demonstrated, the restraint that has been demonstrated by the interrogators. And as one senator, I admonish you and hope and pray that you don't unduly discipline our interrogators and impair their ability to save American lives. And I thank all three of you for your service to America. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator Inhofe. I'd like to go back to a very important point raised by Senator Inhofe. And you responded but I think a little clarity is needed. The Army Field Manual was drawn up against the background of what basically the United States had confronted in its previous wars. And that was state-sponsored aggression by nations which, I think, in many respects, were subject to the Geneva Convention. And now, as Senator Inhofe pointed out very dramatically, we are facing a totally different enemy. And as a consequence, that field manual, has to remain in place should we have the misfortune of a state-sponsored conflict. But a separate manual has to be drawn up that addresses the complexity of the individuals that we're now capturing in Iraq or have and are continuing to. Am I correct in that, General Craddock?

CRADDOCK: Mr. Chairman, I would agree. It's a very different set of conditions out there that we've got to recognize. I think it would be helpful not to -- we need to understand what's been done and use that as the building blocks to provide the way for a future look that will put us in stead where we don't have is ambiguous situations, where commanders know what they can do, where lines are drawn. Yes, sir.

WARNER: Well, I thank you very much. Several of us on this committee, and I think probably all members of the committee are anxious that Congress has a role in this to try and determine how we best devise federal law such that the men and women of the armed forces of the United States in the promulgation of their duties, be it on the battlefield, here or in maintaining these detention facilities, have a clear understanding of what they can and cannot do. Did you wish to add something, General?

CRADDOCK: Mr. Chairman, if I may. Just to respond to your comment, Senator Inhofe, the fact is that probably, in my judgment, a lot of what has been discussed, a lot of what now is in the open press and a lot of these applications of these interrogation techniques will see change one to the Manchester document and a new chapter on interrogation resistance.

WARNER: You'd better explain, for the record, the Manchester document.

CRADDOCK: This is the Al Qaida training manual. It has two chapters here on detention and interrogation resistance techniques.

WARNER: Good. And in case their people are captured, how they should conduct themselves...

CRADDOCK: Exactly.

WARNER: ... to resist any...

CRADDOCK: They are trained using these techniques to resist interrogation.

WARNER: That's very clear. And, General Craddock, and all the witnesses, that's the value of this very important report which each of you have put together. Senator Clinton?

CLINTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't know where to begin. General Craddock, was it any member of the Al Qaida or Taliban who took pictures of these interrogations, techniques and thereby revealed them to the world?

CRADDOCK: I'm not aware of Al Qaida or Taliban taking pictures of interrogations at -- oh, you're talking about for their manual.

CLINTON: No. The discussion about how these interrogation techniques became public and who knew about them and what kind of information that might give to the prisoners to resist interrogation, in fact, these techniques became public because of actions and decisions made by members of the United States military. Isn't that correct?

CRADDOCK: Not that I'm aware of.

CLINTON: Well, think of Abu Ghraib. And think of the pictures that were published that were taken by members of military police units and others inside that prison. Isn't that what happened?

CRADDOCK: Senator, those were not interrogations.

CLINTON: No, but they led to the inquiry about interrogations, did they not?

CRADDOCK: The timing on these techniques we talked about today, the applications, the Joint Task Force Guantanamo applications of the techniques, preceded those pictures.

CLINTON: I guess my point, General, is that as we look at what our real goal here is, our goal is to be effective in interrogation in order to obtain information in order to deter attacks and in order to find out significant intelligence that will enable us to defeat this enemy. Isn't that right?

CRADDOCK: I agree.

CLINTON: So I think it's important to put in the record that at least for some of us, at least speaking for myself, my concern about this is driven primarily about how effective we are going to be. And there is considerable evidence that the underlying techniques, as well as the publicity about those techniques, which did not come from the enemy that we were interrogating but from people on the inside within our own military is really what should be the focus here, that if these techniques were so effective, why didn't we get better information? Why do we still have people who have been resistant? And especially in Guantanamo, where they have been basically out of communication for three years. So I think that the intensity behind some of the questioning that you have received really begins from a fundamental disagreement about how we can be effective in pursuing the objectives that we all agree are the ones that are most important.

CLINTON: And, at least from my perspective, I think that we made serious errors in authorizing and permitting a number of these techniques -- because they were not effective. And, in a free society, which we still are, it is very difficult to keep such behavior totally private. So, at some point, they were going to be revealed and disclosed, as the log about detainee 063 has been revealed and disclosed. So I guess, General, you know, the questions that many of us have are really about the underlying attitude that has been taken toward this series of investigations that have been carried out. And our belief that we haven't done all we should to be as effective as we need to be, and the failure of accountability, leads to ineffectiveness. General Schmidt and General Furlow, let me ask you: Your report indicates that several past interrogators at Guantanamo Bay declined to be interviewed and are currently in civilian status. How many of the FBI's allegations of aggressive interrogators involved former interrogators who declined to be interviewed?

FURLOW: Sir -- excuse me, ma'am -- on the FBI side, none of the FBI agents refused to be interviewed. And the reason why we were not able to talk to the individuals that had prior experience down there was that we do not have subpoena capability under the A.R. 15-6, which was an administrative investigation. And that's what limited it. If the person was still currently serving in the military, we could force them to visit with us. If they had served their time in Guantanamo and returned to civilian life as a reservist, we were not able to subpoena them and force them to visit with us.

CLINTON: And how many people were you unable to subpoena or force to visit with you?

FURLOW: Ma'am, we felt that there was not anybody that was material to this case.

CLINTON: How many, though, were you unable to visit with or subpoena? FURLOW: I'd say less than 10.

CLINTON: General, is that your recollection?

SCHMIDT: Yes, ma'am. It was very, very few. Those that we could not get to that were relevant to our investigation was just a small amount. Principally, it involved one that involved the death threat, in a ruse that we found out about in an interrogation. That was the one that concerned us the most.

CLINTON: And wasn't there also a former interrogator who wrote a book about his experiences?

SCHMIDT: That's correct. You're referring to Sergeant Eric Sarr. He was on his way to make a documentary. We asked if he had seen things, would he like to air that? Would he like them investigated? He declined to be interviewed by us repeatedly.

CRADDOCK: Senator, let me set the record straight. He was not an interrogator. He was a translator, a linguist.

CLINTON: Well, as a translator/linguist, he would have been, perhaps, accompanying interrogators and therefore a witness, would he not?

CRADDOCK: He participated in one or two interrogations that we can establish as a linguist.

CLINTON: Well, General Craddock, I just hope that at some point we can clear the air on these matters because I think we need to. And whatever revisions need to be made in the field manual or the Geneva Conventions, the United States ought to be a leader in that. And we ought to do so both because that's what we believe and the kind of people we are, and also because we want to be effective. There's a lot at stake. And, you know, it doesn't inspire confidence when we have all of these unanswered questions and when General Miller, who we know, went from Guantanamo to Iraq and was told to Gitmo-ize Abu Ghraib, is basically the central figure in both of these investigations and yet, once again, is free of any accountability or any admonishment. It raises serious questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator. I'd like to pick up on the senator's question with regard to 10 individuals which you could not reach for interviews. At any time, did you bring this inability to reach people to General Craddock? And, General Craddock, did you consider going to a higher level? In other words, you possibly could call the director of the FBI to facilitate the interviews?

CRADDOCK: Mr. Chairman, it wasn't brought to my attention. This is the first I've heard of 10 people.

WARNER: Well, it seems to me, and I will work with you, we've got to go back and revisit this -- what appears to be a gap and see whether or not we can facilitate filling that in.

CRADDOCK: I understand, sir.

WARNER: And I thank you very much. Did you wish you say something, General Schmidt?

SCHMIDT: Senator Warner, the idea that we were unable to get to certain people, I just want to make sure we're clear that it was a small number. They were all civilians. None were FBI. And we were almost always able to work around other witnesses to events to corroborate that. This was an informal investigation to fact find, not a criminal investigation. But when we found something that needed to be elevated, we did in the report and that was the death threat.

WARNER: But I think the two unsubstantiated FBI e-mails, I believe -- you want to revisit your comment that they were all not FBI? There is an area which troubles me considerably.

SCHMIDT: The one FBI agent and the one in question, we're very familiar with who she is. We made, to my knowledge, five or six attempts to get to her. She was not made available. We discussed that with DOJ, who is also running an investigation. They have her e-mails. They have not interviewed her at this time, either. She is not available.

WARNER: I'll come back. I don't want to take the time of my colleague. But that's got to be corrected and straightened. Senator Roberts?

ROBERTS: I don't have the time to ask you a lot of questions. And I think a lot of questions have been asked. And I think you've answered them to the best of your capability. But I do have an observation and a statement, much in the same fashion as Senator Inhofe. I want to tell you, General Craddock, I think you did the right thing by not citing General Miller. I don't agree with the assessment by other senators here that he is a central figure in this case. I'm quite sure that General Miller regrets not keeping a closer eye on those two interrogations -- two interrogations out of 24,000 that we've had. He probably regrets not knowing what each person down there under his command had for lunch, either. But certainly that lapse is far outweighed by the miracle that he worked in his time at Gitmo. I take that from staff members of the Intelligence Committee who were interrogators at the time, knew of the chaos, knew of the disorder. This officer, while his MOS was not in keeping with perhaps that assignment was able to be a problem-solver. Along with General Craddock, I visited Gitmo this past weekend. I got a thorough look. Nothing was denied to me, more especially as the chairman of the Intelligence Committee. And I think that that system that General Miller, much maligned now that he is, brought order to chaos in his management of both the intelligence and the detention operations there. He pioneered the management and oversight systems that have made that detention facility an operation where -- my view is in opposition to those who have already spoken -- that we can be proud of under the circumstances of what we're gaining in intelligence and more especially the treatment of the detainees -- and they're not detainees, they're terrorists. And they're very bad people. Never, never before in history has any country faced with a barbaric terrorism implemented a policy of terrorist detention so unique, so unprecedented and so humane, in my personal view.

ROBERTS: Let me review those numbers again. There were 26 allegations of abuse that came from FBI personnel at Gitmo. Nobody taking pictures -- that was in Abu Ghraib; had nothing to do with interrogation. And if those nine incidents amounted to what could have been serious allegations, six of those turned out to be false allegations or incidents that were within the rules. So if I am correct, we ended up with two incidents, along with one more the investigators found along the way, to bring a grand total of three confirmed incidents. That's part of the 24,000 total interrogations that have been conducted at Gitmo. So, out of 24,000 interrogations, three total incidents. My math, that makes for an incident rate of 0.000125. What field manual could be written to prevent incidents or an incident rate or a mistake in regards to 24,000 interrogations that resulted in an incident rate of 0.000125? And is this what this has come down to? Three misdemeanors out of 24,000 interrogations -- three misdemeanors that occurred two or three years ago. Not today. Not the practices that are being conducted today under your command and under the commander down there. Now, I am in no way condoning incidents that are described in this report. Nobody's saying that. But I don't think that they are a matter of national press attention, which will probably be the case. They're unfortunate, not only because they are unworthy of our great nation, but because they are not effective in getting reliable information. That's the point that Senator Clinton made. But you understand that and the commander understands that. And the young men and women that I visited with personally certainly understand that. Their motto on the back of their cover says "Honor bound." When you went through that facility, everybody saluted you and said, "Honor bound," and you said, "Honor bound" back to them. Things have changed at Gitmo in result of all of this that we're talking about. I'll tell you what this report says to me. It says that the three relative minor incidents are not reflective of the vast majority of the important interrogations being conducted at Gitmo. I'm talking about Gitmo as of today. It says that, overall, things are going well under very dangerous circumstances. I saw this for myself, the outstanding work our hardworking men and women are doing down there.

ROBERTS: I'm getting into trouble because of the report that I issued back in Kansas. Because I said, food, yes, the detainees are getting a choice of 113 Muslim dishes. Our troops are not getting that kind of choice. On health care, I said the clinic and/or a hospital that had to basically treat the wounds of these people who came in from Afghanistan and we have taken down 80 percent of the Taliban and also Al Qaida, these are the very bad people who are left and are terrorists and are still there. And they have better health care and better facilities than many of my real small communities. That got me in trouble. Ice cream on Sunday did as well. If they are compliant, what about the home conditions? Are the conditions in terms of any kind of a communal living? Well, we saw them playing soccer. We saw them playing volleyball. I didn't see anybody playing ping-pong but it was there. What about the observation of their culture and their religion? They pray five times a day, at least 20 times. Everybody is very reverent and silent. No American touches the Koran. None. A Muslim does. And they're in each cell. And so we are really respecting that. General Hood, who is the current commander, who happens to be from Kansas and I talked to his dad this morning. And I told his dad he was doing an outstanding job. He gave us a wonderful briefing. He runs a tight ship with excellent oversight, supervision, and detainees are treated humanely and respectfully both in the interrogation and the detention facilities. And it's getting results. Now, that was another big point that Senator Clinton made. And I wish she was here. We are getting valuable intelligence from Gitmo every day. I saw the interrogations. I know the material we have. I know -- I'm not going to get into anything specific here -- but I do know that it is current and can save lives more especially in events like Casablanca and Madrid and, yes, London and, yes, plots against the United States. And we're using carrots, not sticks. I didn't see any perfume. I didn't see any straddling. I didn't see any sleep deprivation because that doesn't work. The positive side does work. So the men and women working at Gitmo handle very dangerous people every day but it seems lately they have more to worry about from Congress. And that's what they told me. What's going on in Congress -- and not only do they know it but the prisoners know it, then, the prisoners they hold and interrogate. Why would you shackle somebody to the floor?

ROBERTS: Prior to the interrogation, in earlier days, because their lives were at stake. They had made homemade weapons, despite our very best efforts, and they spit in people's faces. And that's not even the first of it. The rest of it is so abhorrent that I can't get into it -- not to mention any kind of physical activity, even if shackled, that they would do. So, to protect the person who is leading them into the interrogation room, that would be an obvious thing that you might want to do. General Schmidt and General Furlow, we have conducted a very thorough investigation. I thank you for that. You've answered all my questions in regards to the allegations. I think the brave women and men down there at Gitmo are working hard every day to keep it safe. They have enough to worry about about any more ill-informed accusations or abuse or calls for closing down Gitmo. I think, with the current practices, the current oversight -- I think they need our support and thanks for a job well done. And, General Craddock, the work being done at Gitmo is important. I want you to know -- and your people down there -- that you have my support. I'd like to remind my colleagues: We are in a war on a global scale. It's against a vicious and determined enemy. They reside in Gitmo. They're interested in one thing, and that's killing. The terrorists at Gitmo know today about this hearing. They know about the questions. They know about who goes down there. And the people that have asked the most serious questions, and I don't challenge that -- go to Gitmo and take a first hand look. So, when they're down there, these terrorists view their incarceration as part of their jihad. And it's just like that manual that you held up. The more they know about what we are doing, the more they can offset what we're trying to do in terms of interrogation. They know about this hearing. And they doubt our resolve, and they think, down the road, with legal help and wounding themselves and saying they have been basically treated in an inhumane fashion, that they can make a case with the American people. And so they say that the Americans do not have resolve, and that, basically, these kinds of hearings, it seems to me -- really I question whether we have the resolve as well. And I think it's the most unfortunate statement that I would have to make in that regard.

ROBERTS: So I thank you for the job that you're doing. And I called the three parents of the three young men down there who are working so terribly hard. They work one, two, three days in those camps that are so terribly difficult and then have to take one day off, maybe two days off just to get away from it. And I remember that thing on the back of their cover, "Honor Bound." They're doing the right thing. They're getting the best intelligence possible. And I don't think we need to concentrate on three misdemeanors out of 24,000 investigations. I'm way over my time but I really don't give a damn.

WARNER: Senator Kennedy?

KENNEDY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I always thought that we were part of a Geneva Convention because we were concerned about the safety and the well being of our own troops today, tomorrow and in future conflicts. I never thought that the test was we're going to be as bad as whoever we're going to fight in whatever war we're going to be in. It seems to me that we're going to have an expectation that we're going to have our people treated decently. We know the history of many circumstances that they haven't been. But if we're going to find that out, it always seemed to me that the Geneva Convention was there to make sure that we were going to protect our own people if they were being held in other circumstances. And that I still feel, myself, is the appropriate kind of criteria. We've had other discussions about the Geneva Convention and enemy combatants and we'll get back to that at another time. But I don't think we can simply answer as some have done that the behavior -- whatever behavior might have taken place at Guantanamo is acceptable because terrorists do worse. By lowering our standards, we reduce our moral authority in the world, undermine our leadership on the human rights. The FBI found that these torture techniques, as they call them, including the stress position, the 20-hour interrogation marathon, the use of dogs, violate the Constitution. They strenuously objected to them and incredibly the Department of Defense found that these techniques were permissible despite the FBI analysis. Even under the DOD standards, the investigators found that some of the techniques used were not authorized. General Craddock, the report -- I know you've been asked this but I want to come back to it -- the report -- because I think there is a whole question of accountability both in Guantanamo, I think, as well as in Iraq and other places. But let's just focus on this. The report recommended that General Miller be reprimanded but you rejected the recommendation and simply referred the case to the Army inspector general. I know Senator Reed asked you a question, either that question or one similar. I believe you gave an answer. I'll be glad to hear you. Rather than hearing me restate what I think I heard in your answer, maybe you'd address that if you would again, please.

CRADDOCK: What is the question, Senator?

KENNEDY: The question is -- there was a recommendation for disciplining General Miller. You just made a judgment decision that General Miller be reprimanded but you rejected the recommendation and simply referred the case to the Army inspector general. I'm asking you: What was the basis for that?

CRADDOCK: I disapproved the recommendation that he be held accountable for failing to supervise and be admonished. I am required to forward that to the Army inspector general because there is an allegation of wrongdoing. So that's the procedural aspect, Senator. My rationale...

KENNEDY: Well, let me just go back on this. He is the man in command on this. These violations have taken place on his watch and the commission itself found that he ought to be reprimanded on this because it was on his watch. He had the general overall responsibility. But what is it that you find that was wrong about the recommendation that he had responsibility?

CRADDOCK: Senator, their recommendation was that he failed to supervise the interrogation of ISN-063. There were no violations of the interrogation of ISN-063.

KENNEDY: Now, which torture policy are you using now? Are you using the (inaudible) Memorandum now, the one that's been completely discredited? Which torture memorandum are you referring to? That, of course, has been repealed.

CRADDOCK: I'm not referring to any torture memorandum. I'm saying what the report said: "Failed to supervise the interrogation." Not that there were violations in the conduct.

KENNEDY: Aren't you parsing words? "Failed to supervise."

CRADDOCK: Those are not my words.

KENNEDY: Pardon?

CRADDOCK: Those are not my words. I've had to defer that to General Schmidt. Those are his words and General Furlow. They sent that recommendation...

KENNEDY: Well, they made that finding that he failed to supervise.

CRADDOCK: I'm not parsing words. I'm responding...

KENNEDY: OK. Well, if they failed to supervise, that isn't enough. We've had, I don't know -- taking a different time -- 2003, the Navy fired 14 commanding officers for effectively failing to supervise. Fired them. Accountability. Accountability. I'm just trying to find out where the buck stops because this has been an issue and a question, quite frankly...

CRADDOCK: And I understand.

KENNEDY: ... whether this is just a time -- we've heard from the secretary of defense a long time ago there were just a few bad apples. And then we had a number of -- I think eight or 10 or 11 -- different kind of reviews that have been done in the military over this.

KENNEDY: And it never seems to me that we get up to any kind of level. So if it doesn't -- of accountability. We've got the number of people at the lower levels that are recommended for action and for sanction. But it doesn't seem to me that it comes up. And when it doesn't come up, then I have to ask: Well, are they following -- are they doing something? Is there some orders or some procedures that they're following that we don't know about that lets them effectively get away with it?

CRADDOCK: Senator, I disagreed with that recommendation and disapproved it because of a difference of opinion with regard to my investigators concerning the degree of supervision required, necessary or executed. Take your choice. I looked at this several times. I deliberated a long time. As I said earlier, I always, when I am faced with these situations as a commander, try to put myself in that individual's position to try to understand the environment, the scope, the wide range of things going on. I have some experience that allowed me to do that. I looked at what General Miller, according to the report, according to what my investigators told me -- what he did know. And he did know aspects about that interrogation that I felt were important for him to know. It's stated in the report. He did not know -- he admitted he did not know -- all of the applications used by the interrogation teams. But he charged and depended on his subordinates to carry it out in accordance with policy and law, which they did. There was no violation of policy and law. So he placed trust and confidence in them. And they supported -- and I think repaid -- that trust and confidence. And that's my judgment. When you combine that with all the other taskings he had, I felt that he exercised a reasonable degree of supervision during the conduct of that special interrogation program.

KENNEDY: Well, the only thing -- and my time is running out -- he didn't know, I find if he didn't know -- failure to know is still failure to lead, I thought, in the military.

CRADDOCK: Senator...

KENNEDY: No, I remember that a submarine captain that got (inaudible) when he ran into that sandbar going full blast, it wasn't even on the -- he was relieved, because he didn't know. It wasn't on any of the charts. He was dismissed. His career ended in the United States service. Now we're being told that he didn't know. And the question that I would think some are asking is: Is this a failure to lead?

KENNEDY: If you don't punish, then what you're also saying is that it's allowed. The other side of the coin is it's allowed. That's what some people -- that's a message -- you might not agree with that but I think there's a case that can be made for it.

CRADDOCK: Senator, I would disagree with that and I would say that if a commander is required to know every detail about all aspects of the organizations that he commands, he will be unable to lead.

KENNEDY: This isn't every aspect, General. You know what we're talking about. This was the whole purpose for getting information, intelligence. There was a real debate about which techniques were the best to be able to get it. That was all being discussed. He, Miller, was very much involved in this. He eventually moved over to Iraq in order to be able to try and bring the intelligence into more effectiveness. He was the master in terms of this. And the idea that on his watch, that these things were going on and he didn't know about it. And the people that investigated say that he deserved to be reprimanded, and you overturn them, is something that many of us wonder about.

CRADDOCK: As I stated, Senator, he did know about some of those. He stated he knew about it and he stated he didn't know about others. He inherited this. This plan and implementation was ongoing when he arrived. He walked into it and had to, along with many other things, bring it up to speed. He had a significant number of major tasks.

KENNEDY: My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

WARNER: General Craddock, you've, three times now, explained very carefully your professional judgment in changing this recommendation of General Schmidt. But I would like to put into the record, which I think you will agree with me, in no way do you have any lesser respect for his professional judgment which was contrary to yours. And in no way is your reversal to reflect adversely on either his judgment or his performance of heading up this team at your directing.

CRADDOCK: Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I think the team here did a wonderful job. I think that's evidenced by the report they've provided and in really all but one recommendation which I heartily approved, this was very difficult. Members have said that. Discovery learning is difficult. It's a somewhat ambiguous area. And I think, again, I've told General Schmidt and General Furlow, reasonable men will reasonably disagree. And I disagree with the scope of supervision required, the degree, the level. And that's it...

WARNER: The facts are there. I just wanted to make that observation. There's been some inference about the hearing that we're now having in the public. My understanding is that you briefed the secretary on this yesterday. Am I correct?

CRADDOCK: It was the day before yesterday.

WARNER: The day before yesterday. And in due course, will you -- normally, the department in the previous investigations have afforded the opportunity for the panel, in this case, yourself and these two officers, to brief an open session in the Pentagon, individuals and the press. Am I correct?

CRADDOCK: It was the day before yesterday.

WARNER: The day before yesterday. And in due course, normally, the department in the previous investigations, have afforded the opportunity for the panel, in this case, yourself and these two officers, to brief an open session in the Pentagon, individuals and the press. Am I correct on that?

CRADDOCK: Yes, Mr. Chairman. As I understand, there's some proposal working now for some activity this afternoon to do that. WARNER: That's my understanding that this report presented to this committee this morning will be presented in open session at the Pentagon tomorrow. I wanted to make that clear. Thank you very much. Senator Sessions.

SESSIONS: Thank you. And I do know that in a free country we have to have public reports and public hearings. I do think that we in Congress have pushed this awfully far. As I calculated, this is about the 30th hearing we've had on prisoner treatment since the beginning of the war on terrorism. I think at least a dozen major investigations have been conducted. And I, frankly, think unless we're just trying to play politics, unless we're just trying to make some political points, perhaps in the future, we'd do better to have our hearings in chambers, closed hearings. And if there's something that needs to be made public, we'll make it public...

WARNER: But, Senator, I bring to your attention that this report, I was advised earlier, is going to be made public at the Department of Defense this afternoon. It seems to be that it was incumbent upon this committee to receive that report here in open session this morning in the same way it will be presented this afternoon at the Pentagon.

SESSIONS: I understand. And I respect the chairman. And there's no better patriot or better chairman of any committee I've served on than you and I'm just expressing my personal view that it's time to take this out of the number one project on our agenda. And I would just say my colleague, the senior senator from Massachusetts, he said, again, he's compared the treatment that we give the prisoners to those of our enemies. And that's just not fair. He said we're going to be as bad as those we fight. He said our prisons are the same as Saddam -- are like Saddam Hussein's prisons...

KENNEDY: Mister, I don't mind being quoted but I need to be quoted accurately. I have never mentioned Saddam Hussein...

SESSIONS: Well, Senator, not in this hearing...

KENNEDY: No, I didn't.

SESSIONS: Well, let me see if I can get the correct quote. But I believe the correct quote was -- see if I'm wrong -- that we've opened his prisons under new management.

KENNEDY: I'll let the record -- they can read back what I've said from...

SESSIONS: I just want to say that I'm concerned about that. And the thing with senators, as a name known worldwide, other members of this committee are known throughout the world, and when we make allegations against the men and women in uniform who are out there serving at great risk because we sent them, then we need to be careful we don't suggest that we have a policy here of bad treatment when the record indicates otherwise. And as to how their prisoners are treated, their heads have been cut off, they're tortured, torture chambers have existed. I met and had a press conference with seven or eight who had their hands cut off by Saddam Hussein.

SESSIONS: General Schmidt, did you see any prisoner or hear any reports of a prisoner that died in Guantanamo or any prisoner there who suffered a broken bone or serious permanent injury as a result of any treatment in Guantanamo?

SCHMIDT: To my knowledge, there have been no deaths of any detainee at Guantanamo. And the only injury that is significant was one that they believe was self-inflicted, and he's under continual care in the hospital down there.

SESSIONS: I think that's important. I know you substantiated two allegations. One of those was the use of duct tape. Now I don't dismiss your finding, but I'd like for you to reiterate, that's one of your two findings of abuse there, of allegations. Explain the duct tape situation.

SCHMIDT: Sir, the duct tape was there was a prisoner who was undergoing interrogation. And by various accounts, he began to chant either Koranic verses or a resistance message, according to one of two witnesses. There were some number of other detainees, 12 to 17, I believe I heard those numbers, in the vicinity of that. The interrogator directed the military police to quiet him down. The military policeman looked around and saw some duct tape. He said, "This?" The interrogator said, "Go ahead and do it." He took some duct tape, put it on the detainee's mouth. And within a moment or so, he had worked that off by wiggling his jaw, I guess around. They applied another one. They wrapped it around his mouth and his face. He continued to work hard, and he was able to get it off his mouth. Finally, the military policeman said (inaudible) wrap it around his head, top to bottom, around his mouth, and that will do it. And in fact, it did. The FBI allegation of that came when the interrogator or the supervisor walked down the hall and said to two FBI agents, and he was laughing. He said, "You need to come see this." That's where the allegation came from. And that was the situation that generated that particular allegation.

SESSIONS: I think that shows the sensitivity of the military to improper conduct. I'm not sure that was improper under the circumstances. Perhaps it was unnecessary, but it may not have been. I wasn't there. I don't know the nature of the prisoner or what kind of message he may have been sending to other prisoners. I remember the colonel in Iraq who fired a gun when his troops were taking fire near the head of an Al Qaida or terrorist person, and he was cashiered out of the military. A man from the military. He didn't touch the man, but he used threat of force in a way that was improper and was removed. With regard to Abu Ghraib, we said over and over and over again that the higher-ups are involved; the higher-ups are involved. I think we ought to say right here and now that the higher-ups were not involved in Abu Ghraib.

SESSIONS: They prosecuted those people who were involved, whose pictures showed they were involved. They've been convicted and sentenced to jail and they've not produced any evidence, credible evidence at all that higher-ups ordered them to do that. In fact, the facts show there was no interrogation ongoing. It was just bad behavior by a group of soldiers on the graveyard shift that should never have happened. And they're now in jail. General Schmidt, you made a finding that where some abuses may have occurred that you found no inhumane treatment. Is that correct?

SCHMIDT: I found that none crossed the line into being inhumane.

SESSIONS: And none crossed the line into torture?

SCHMIDT: That's correct, Senator.

SESSIONS: And you found, I suppose, no systematic plan or a process by which prisoners were subjected to inhumane treatment or torture?

SCHMIDT: That's correct, Senator.

SESSIONS: And you were free to conduct this investigation as you saw fit?

SCHMIDT: That's correct. It was very pointed. The objectives were very pointed on it.

SESSIONS: Mr. Chairman, I think we have created an entirely misimpression somehow, some way of what's going on at Abu Ghraib. I look forward to going with you tomorrow. I know you're personally looking forward to examining what went on there. Senator Roberts has been. And I went when it was in the old prison some time ago. And this is a new facility -- spent $100 million, I believe, on it. If it's the site they showed me where they intended to build it, it's a beautiful site on the water. But, Mr. Chairman, I think that it's important for us to remember that these are dangerous individuals, that 17,000 have been detained in Iraq, and only 800 have been sent to Guantanamo. Now only about 500, a little more, remain. Of those 200 or so that have been released, twelve of them have been re-arrested for waging war against our soldiers and against the peace and stability in Iraq or Afghanistan. These are not people that are not dangerous. They are dangerous. And I would say one more thing. Since they are unlawful combatants, they are not entitled legally to the protections of the Geneva Conventions. And we have a right to interrogate them. And we have a right to try them by military tribunals in my opinion just like the case of the defendants in the ex parte querying case were tried during World War II. These are not American citizens charged with fraud or dope dealing. They are terrorists waging a war against civilization and democracy around the world. I think we cannot deny ourselves the right to utilize techniques within the rules of war that allow us to interrogate and gain information that can save innocent lives. Thank you very much.

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. It is the intention of the chairman to take a trip on Friday to Guantanamo, members of this committee. We may have a seat or two available. If they so desire, we'd like to...

SESSIONS: I hope to join you.

WARNER: Yes, I understand that. But I have to point out that there is a small (inaudible) of a hurricane and that is now being examined by Aviation Department very carefully.

KENNEDY: Mr. Chairman?

WARNER: Yes?

KENNEDY: Just briefly, in response to what I had said here, I'm always glad to have someone misrepresent what I'm saying and then differ with it, which is what we had here. This country has had a very proud tradition adhering to the Geneva Conventions.

KENNEDY: Some people think that that kind of condition should not continue to be a part of American policy. I differ with them, because I accept the concept that the principal reason we have the Geneva is to protect Americans -- protect Americans.

WARNER: If they become captives.

KENNEDY: Yes. The fact is, I would hope that we are not going to go and set as a standard the lowest level of conduct and say, "Well, because another side does it, we're going to do that as well." I remember echoing in my ears what John McCain said, and that's that the more they tortured me, the less I was willing to give them. John McCain said that.

WARNER: But...

KENNEDY: Let me finish.

WARNER: Yes.

KENNEDY: So when we get all of our lectures out here in this committee about how we're treating people, it does seem to me that it is appropriate, that it's easy to get all worked up, and all of us do about the challenges that we're facing as a country and a society and about the service men and women that do so nobly. But I would certainly hope that we are not beyond the point of understanding what has been historically and I believe still is in the best interests of American servicemen and what works in terms of getting information and intelligence, both works in getting the information and the intelligence and that can later be used in terms of bringing those individuals to justice. And that's basically the point that I would make.

WARNER: Senator, I assure you, there are a number on this committee who are working on that very issue today.

SESSIONS: Mr. Chairman, I would just say. The senator said: Are we going to be as bad as those we fight? That was just a few minutes ago. We're not as bad as those we're going to fight. We're not adopting their techniques. We discipline people who violate the law or the rules. And as a matter of fact, almost 200 service personnel have been disciplined, in one form or another, for the failure of discipline.

WARNER: We've got to move on, gentlemen.

SESSIONS: Well, I just feel like we need to be careful about what we say about those who serve us.

WARNER: Senator Cornyn?

CORNYN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't know what the headlines are going to be written about this hearing today, but I hope they include the conclusion that AR 15- 6 found no evidence of torture or inhumane treatment at JTF Gitmo. Notwithstanding some of the statements that are made here and elsewhere, I think that's an important conclusion. And I might just -- General Craddock, you were engaged in an exchange on the Geneva Conventions.

CORNYN: But as you pointed out, the detainees here are either members of the Taliban or Al Qaida fighters. In the case of Al Qaida, of course, they don't wear a uniform. They don't recognize the chain of command. They don't conduct their activities according to the law of war. And it's interesting. During the confirmation proceeding for Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, we had quite a debate among legal scholars including the dean of Yale Law School who ultimately conceded that being non-signatories to the Geneva Conventions, not recognizing the military hierarchy or the law of war, that Al Qaida was not covered by the Geneva Convention. And I believe that's essentially what you have said here today. And I happen to agree with you. And I think it's really irrefutable. We have three federal courts who've examined that, have so concluded. And I think it's absolutely right. On the other hand, you've stated it's our policy not to engage in torture or inhumane treatment and as being inconsistent with our values and certainly, I'm relieved to know that this exhaustive investigation so concluded. I want to ask about the 20th hijacker, al-Khatami, as he's been identified in other contexts. This is the individual that apparently had committed himself to committing suicide; that is, losing his own life in pursuit of his cause by participating in the Flight 93, United Airlines Flight 93. Due to the bravery of civilians on board of that flight, went down in a field in Pennsylvania rather than hit the Capitol or the White House or other places that they intended. This individual, in addition to being an Al Qaida operative, once he was captured in Afghanistan and transferred to Gitmo, he withstood any interrogation techniques for about eight months. Isn't that correct, General Craddock?

CRADDOCK: That's correct, Senator.

CORNYN: And it was in that context as well as the ongoing war that we were engaged in in our efforts to gather actionable intelligence in order to protect not only our troops in the field, but our civilians here in the homeland, that efforts were made to defeat his counter interrogation defenses. And it was in that context that what we've heard discussed occurred. I guess when I read the conclusion here -- I want to ask you a little bit about that -- as a result of this investigation -- I believe that that General Schmidt and General Furlow have done an admirably job here. But just in terms of the ultimate conclusion about General Miller, it's my understanding from what's been said here, is that the interrogation plan used on al-Khatami was legally permissible and that there's been no finding that it deviated in any way from a lawful interrogation of this Al Qaida operative. Is that correct, sir?

CRADDOCK: The special interrogation plan developed, used both FM-3452 interrogation techniques and those authorized in the 2 December memo. Now the interrogation technique then is manifested by the development of the Joint Task Force Guantanamo application. And that's where the interrogators look at: What is it that this guy has resisted? What have we tried that didn't work? How do we get him out of his comfort zone? How do we get him to be discomfortable, to be on edge? We need to be able to break his resistance. And then they developed those applications to do that. Those were found to be, again, consistent with and in accordance with pride and ego down and futility.

CORNYN: And the means used on this detainee, al-Khatami, were using authorized procedures. Is that correct?

CRADDOCK: I understand the read report, that's correct. But I'll defer to General Schmidt. Is that correct, Mark?

SCHMIDT: They were within the broad authorized techniques authorized by the field manual and the secretary of defense memo of 2 December. That is correct. At the application end, they did stay above the threshold of inhumane treatment. There was no torture or inhumane treatment.

SCHMIDT: Within that, I found that each individual act, whether authorized or unauthorized, had a rolling, cumulative effect on this individual. And it was the cumulative effect that we found to be abusive in its totality and degrading.

CORNYN: General Schmidt, I want to raise a predicate, my great admiration for you and all of our folks in the military, but particularly for the difficult job that you have undertaken here. My dad served 31 years in the Air Force, and I have great admiration for you and everyone that wears that uniform. But I have a little trouble understanding how, if an interrogation on one day is within authorized limits and on another day it's within authorized limits, how you can say that the cumulative effect was abusive and degrading and somehow fell below authorized limits. Can you explain that for us?

SCHMIDT: Sir, the limits of each interrogation is what they were. And they're usually limited by the amount of time that an interrogation team would be in the interrogation room. It's much like -- and the analogy would be, playing music that you don't like; that might be annoying. If there are no limits placed on the duration that you're going to listen to that music, pick your worst music, and you listen to it, and at somewhere at 10 hours, you think you've had enough and maybe at 20 hours. But at some point, there might be a limit where that's abusive music, I mean, that the environment becomes abusive. And that is the cumulative effect that we tried to get to. And Senator, I will tell you that it was very difficult for us as military members to go in there and look for alleged abuses. And, of course, you look at a character like Al Kahtani and you say, "Do the means justify the ends?" That was not part of our charter. It's: "Did something happen? Were there abuses?" And that's what we identified. Then we attempted to say, "Well, were they authorized or not? Substantiated or not?" And over the course of time, we felt that this particular individual, as heinous a person as he is, the cumulative effect of that long duration -- 160 days of the segregation and the increased aggressive interrogation applications, constituted abusive, degrading treatment. And it's pretty hard to look through some of those things that are in there and say, "Was he degraded? What's the definition of degrading to a reasonable man?" So we had to make those judgment calls. And, sir, that's what we did.

CORNYN: Finally -- and I respect your answer -- for myself, I look at this person as someone who's not only willing to take his own life in pursuit of his cause but, obviously, the life of a lot of other innocent people.

CORNYN: And I noticed he was dehydrated due to his own refusal to take fluids, so he had to be put on an I.V. He, obviously, was denying himself -- you weren't denying him water; he was denying it to himself as well as fasting. And so I personally am glad that the interrogators used humane and authorized interrogation techniques to get the information out of him that they did. And I trust they saved American lives and lives of other innocent people in that context. But thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Senator Chambliss?

CHAMBLISS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, first of all, let me join the chorus of my colleagues in commending you gentlemen for the job you did. This is an extremely difficult task that you were given. And, obviously, there's still some stones unturned that you're going to go back and look at. But at the end of the day I don't see anything we've talked about today affecting a change in your conclusions. But even with the difficulty of the job that you three men had in carrying out your duty, the job that those guards and those men and women who are serving at Guantanamo is, frankly, much more difficult, in my opinion. I've been to Guantanamo twice. I was there before Camp Delta was built. I went back after Camp Delta was built. The images that we see on the television today relative to Guantanamo always show the old cages that these prisoners were put in when they first went down there. Those cages, as we know, have not been used in years. Camp Delta was built for the purpose of providing them with more adequate housing, more in line with the Geneva Convention, although we probably didn't have to do that. When I was down there the first time, I was told by guards about the fact that these prisoners were spitting on them, that they were taking human feces and throwing on them, and they were having put up with these kinds of conditions. And we just had a delegation that returned from Guantanamo this past week; group of senators that went down there. Those senators came back with these same stories from individual prisoners who now, in spite of the new accommodations that they have -- they're spit on regularly. They're cursed regularly. Human feces is thrown on them regularly. Two African-Americans from my home state made the comment to my colleague from Georgia about the fact that the worst racial slurs that could be used against an African-American are used against them regularly. This is the type of condition that our troops are in. And under those conditions, we have allegations of three substantiated cases out of 25 interrogations that have taken place.

CHAMBLISS: And I join Senator Sessions and Senator Roberts and Senator Inhofe in thinking that, "Gee whiz, under the conditions that our folks are literally in combat in in Guantanamo, that's amazing that we haven't had more than three." One of them, she was spit on and went out of the room and did something she shouldn't have done, but it was a very emotional act on her part. And certainly she shouldn't have done it, she's been reprimanded, as she should have been, and we've moved on. I'm going back Monday week, Mr. Chairman, and if anybody can't go with you, they're certainly welcome to go with me. I know I've invited all the members of the Intelligence Committee, but anybody on this committee is welcome to go. General Craddock, you're absolutely right in your comments regarding that training manual. Let's don't stick our head in the sand. The American people need to know and understand that Al Qaida's watching this hearing today as we speak. And the training manual's already been rewritten, I'm sure, to upgrade it to where now the terrorists are being trained as to how to respond to new types of interrogation that we may utilize. So is this the right thing to do or isn't it? You know, I guess Senator Sessions may be right in one respect. But I respect the chairman. And if it's going to be public, then it's only right that we come here today to let the American people know and understand what's really going on in Guantanamo. While I disagree with some of the statements that Senator Clinton made relative to this issue, I do agree with her on one thing, and that is the ultimate question, General Craddock, is whether or not we're being effective with our interrogation. And I think I know the answer to that because I've been told that answer by folks who have been down there. We have some Intelligence Committee staff that were interrogators. But let me just give you-all an opportunity to answer that question: Are we getting information from these prisoners at Guantanamo and have we gotten information in the three and half years, two and a half years now that they've been there that have saved the lives of American men and women?

CRADDOCK: Senator, absolutely, yes, in response to your question. We have and we are today still getting information that is relevant, that it is actionable and is supporting our servicemembers in the field in the global war on terrorism. And I'll defer to my colleagues to further amplify.

SCHMIDT: To my knowledge, that's absolutely a true statement. It continues to be a fairly fertile ground for information.

FURLOW: Yes, sir, Senator. My time at Gitmo, visiting with them -- they pride themself on being a model for strategic intelligence gathering and they continue to get intelligence. Now, the specifics, I'm not privilege of that nor did I delve into that during the portion of our investigation.

CHAMBLISS: One other thing I think we need to emphasize, and that is the type of people who are down there. They've been characterized, General Craddock, as the meanest, nastiest people in the world and their sole purpose in life is to kill and harm Americans right now, and we know that.

CHAMBLISS: In spite of that, we have released some 250 of these prisoners, I believe, over the last two years. And I also know that we have had public information relative to at least 10 individuals who were incarcerated at Guantanamo who were released who have either been captured or killed on the battlefield or who we know are operating today in the process of killing or trying to kill and harm Americans. Am I correct about that?

CRADDOCK: That's correct, Senator. We believe the number's 12 right now -- confirmed 12 either recaptured or killed on the battlefield.

CHAMBLISS: And those are the ones we know about; doesn't include the ones that we don't know about who have nowhere to go but back to Afghanistan or back to Iraq to, again, try to kill and harm Americans. So I look forward to going back to Guantanamo for any number of reasons, obviously to observe what's going on. One other thing that I did while I was down there: After Camp Delta was built, I had the opportunity to go in and observe an interrogation taking place or several interrogations taking place -- that they took me into the room and we looked through the glass where they couldn't see us but we could see them. And, obviously, there was nothing improper going on. As I walked out, I said, "What's going on over here?" And they said, "Another interrogation." Well, that wasn't one they planned to take me to to see. I said, "Well, let's go in," and we did, unannounced. And, obviously, there was nothing improper going on relative to an interrogation that was not planned for me to see. So I, again, appreciate the job that you do, but there are a lot of folks from my home state who were either guardsmen, reservists or active duty that were at Guantanamo on occasions that I've been down there and ones that I've talked to who have been there and they've come back. And the conditions under which they have had to operate have been deplorable from the standpoint of the treatment directed at them by the prisoners. And in spite of that, they have just done a very professional job, in my opinion, of conducting themselves and in making every branch of the service proud that they're a part of that service and their rendering of that service at Guantanamo. So gentleman, again, thank you very much for your service to our country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. And I think it's extremely important that you brought out those facts with regard to the abuses being suffered by the military and civilian personnel tasked with this difficult interrogation process. And it's been over the years. I judge that by now that's been somewhat curtailed and contained or is it still at a level that's troublesome?

CRADDOCK: Mr. Chairman, any incident is troublesome. We now have detainees, if you will, aligned based upon their actions toward the guards. We know where to expect it most. However, I was at Gitmo recently. I talked to some sailors who were on a guard force in a camp that was supposedly with detainees who were more cooperative. And I said, "What's your worse day?" and their answer was, "They did this," or, "They did that." So it happens in most of the camp still occasionally.

WARNER: Continues to happen?

CRADDOCK: Indeed, sir.

WARNER: Well, I hope appropriate measures are taken. Senator Levin, you wish to correct the record?

LEVIN: No, not correction just clarifications of some factual matter for the record.

WARNER: Let me interrupt for all members. We will reconvene just as quickly as we can in 222 for a closed session of this hearing.

LEVIN: This will just literally take a couple of minutes, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I understand your task, General Schmidt and General Furlow, it was to look at interrogations where the FBI was present. Is that correct?

SCHMIDT: No, sir. To be more correct, we were to look into allegations of FBI assertions that interrogations had taken place. They did not see these interrogations. They possibly had heard of it. It was any allegation that they had that we were doing things untoward.

LEVIN: OK, well how many interrogations would have been involved in what you looked at: 50, 100? Give us a rough idea.

SCHMIDT: I'm going to say thousands.

LEVIN: You looked at thousands of interrogations.

SCHMIDT: Data that would have covered thousands.

LEVIN: And would you be able to determine whether there were abuses at 24,000 or just at a few thousand or a few hundred? Give us an idea where you made a determination as to whether there was any abuses or not.

SCHMIDT: To be sure I'm close, one moment.

FURLOW: Sir, in the process -- the methodology and looking at the data that's down there, in addition to the FBI memos and electronic correspondence and the unredacted portions, or reviewing them, Guantanamo has a very extensive system called the JDEM (ph), and I had the opportunity to go through and selectively sample a cross range of these detainees and their records that they have provided and through the logs that the M.P. provides that merges into the program there -- and allowing you to look at a large number of interrogations in a very short period of time. The next step of methodology we pursued was by actually looking at the paper copies, which were the main means of being able to conduct business prior to around the first calendar quarter of 2003. So to sit there and say that we've been able to review a couple thousand, 3,000 interrogations is accurate.

LEVIN: Fine: 2,000, 3,000...

FURLOW: Yes, sir.

LEVIN: ... through those records.

FURLOW: Yes, and if there was an indication based on a particular detainee that there was a possibility, then we would trace that fact pattern to follow-on interrogations.

LEVIN: You didn't talk to the people who carried out those interrogations.

FURLOW: No, sir, I talked to those people.

EVIN: You did talk to all the people who interrogated 2,000 or 3,000?

FURLOW: Oh, no, sir. I misunderstood your question. I talked to the interrogators that were presently at Guantanamo.

LEVIN: OK, no, I don't mean that. And did you talk to the interrogators at 2,000 to 3,000 interrogations?

SCHMIDT: No, sir.

FURLOW: No, sir.

LEVIN: It would be a lot fewer than that?

FURLOW: Yes, sir. But what we did do is in the process of identifying who those were, we went and interviewed as many as we could.

LEVIN: Gotcha.

SCHMIDT: But there were interrogators who had interaction with other interrogators that we didn't know that would have been asked or would have known about other opportunities for abuse. So this thing interlaced well beyond those that we had direct contact with that could have surfaced an allegation.

LEVIN: Gotcha. Next question: Were you tasked to look into cases where there were criminal proceedings pending? Or was that something you were not supposed to get into?

SCHMIDT: The criminal proceedings that were pending had nothing to do with detainees at Guantanamo. And I discussed that with the appointing authority, and it turned out it was not related at all.

LEVIN: So none of the pending criminal cases related to any allegations of detainee abuse?

SCHMIDT: That's correct.

LEVIN: Thank you. And did you make any judgment on the legality of techniques, or only as whether or not those techniques were authorized, not authorized, or whether or not they took place?

SCHMIDT: Sir, the legality was not within our purview. And whether -- again, as I stated before, whether the means justified the ends was not within my charter either.

LEVIN: That's helpful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you. We'll now reconvene in 2202, and I thank all participating. I think, General Craddock, General Schmidt, would you like to identify those principals that you have with you that worked on the report, so that their names can be a part of this important record.

CRADDOCK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And before I do that, may I have a correction?

WARNER: Certainly.

CRADDOCK: I'd like to make a correction that I think is important to do so and a final closing statement. First, I guess I miscommunicated to Senator Reed. It's unfortunate he's not here, because in his final statement, he indicated displeasure with apparently he believes or as I understood he said that I have by my decision now tried to pin the blame for something on a lieutenant commander. That is not the case. My modification of that recommendation was...

WARNER: On Miller or the...

CRADDOCK: On the lieutenant commander.

WARNER: Lieutenant commander.

CRADDOCK: ... was the fact that I felt that because in the course of the investigation, two individuals very critical of that investigation, the staff judge advocate and his supervisor, refused to comment and to be interviewed; that the way to force that to happen and potentially then to find out the claim from the lieutenant commander, that he got approval to proceed to communicate the threat from his supervisor and his servicing staff judge advocate would be to force them to make a statement under oath. So my intent there was not to in any way ascribe blame to him by asking for a criminal investigation. It was to, indeed, determine that his allegation was true, because those other people critical to that determination would not make a statement. Secondly, if I may, much of what we have talked about here today is all focused on one detainee: 063, Al Kahtani, the 20th hijacker.

CRADDOCK: And when did this happen? The fingerprint correlation to the 20th hijacker was last summer of '02, about a year -- less than a year after 9/11. We were still wondering when and where is the next attack, as we do today, but maybe with greater angst and greater concern. So when we made this connection and we realized we'd had him for eight months and nothing had happened, he was not providing information, there was an intensity that, "We must do something to find out what he knows because our servicemembers, our nation could be at risk if he is number 20," which he was. So I think that has to be put in perspective. Now, that's one individual with interrogation techniques that some may find in a cumulative effect degrading and abusive. That is not the population of detainees and the techniques and interrogation applications used. That was one individual. There were two plans developed, only one implemented, and the rest of the detainees never got into a special interrogation plan: completely different techniques and applications used for them. I think we need to keep that in perspective as we think through this. Now, sir, if I may...

WARNER: Let me ask General Schmidt and General Furlow if they have any concluding comments, and then we'll -- do you have any concluding comments -- each the opportunity...

SCHMIDT: Mr. Chairman, I just want to make sure that it's clear -- let me get back to the admonishment issue -- that I agree with General Craddock, that commanders, to an extent, rely on the judgment and the experience of their people, their subordinate commanders to carry out the duties that they give them. This was not an assertion of criminal conduct. And Major General Miller did not violate any U.S. law or policy. My recommendation was that he failed to monitor or adequately supervise interrogations of one high-value detainee. And I think the report spells that out in some detail. So I just want to make sure that that was clear. I know Geoff Miller; have worked with him. He is a fine individual. And he had a tall task to complete down there. As we interviewed witnesses on these alleged abuses -- and that was the focus -- to a person, very few did not say "Thank God for General Miller to come down here and clean up some of the chaos that had been organizationally present when he arrived." So this was a hard task to do. But, again, we were focused on the assignment not on the periphery part of this. And we wanted to surface and bubble up the truth, the facts. And we have presented those in this report. And I do thank you for hearing us out.

WARNER: And I thank you. And I assure you this senator, and I think all of us, respect the integrity, the difficulty and your professionalism in handling that delicate issue. Terms and Conditions | Privacy General Furlow?

FURLOW: Thank you, sir. Regarding a review of the FBI documents and the witnesses, I'd like to put in the record here, we reviewed hundreds of documents from the FBI, including the unredacted e-mails.

FURLOW: And we also, over several months, worked diligently to speak personally with every available FBI agent. And we also made specific requests to speak with the ones we were not able to for a minimum -- on three different occasions. And ultimately, we considered the best material evidence that we had to write a report in a timely manner. And I'd like to communicate, sir, that it's been truly an honor to appear before this body today, sir.

WARNER: I thank you very much.

LEVIN: Can I just add my thanks, Mr. Chairman, to yours? We have two officers who have written the report to the best of their ability. And I want to commend them for the professional way in which they've done this to the best of their ability. It's not easy, I'm sure, to reach judgments, regardless of the judgments in this case, but you two have done the best you can. I want to commend you for not just your report but, very frankly, for the slides which, I think, helped us to go through this. Except for the inability to read that one number in the lower right-hand corner, these slides were extremely, extremely helpful to us. And I just want to add my thanks. Thank you all -- you too, General Craddock -- for being here this morning.

WARNER: Now, General, if you'd like to put the names of your colleagues in?

CRADDOCK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll introduce my team: my executive officer, Colonel Milo Miles (ph); staff judge advocate, Captain Marty Evans (ph); my public affairs officer is Colonel Dave McWilliams (ph); and Colonel George Silviera (ph), there in the second row, who's the chief of my actions group; and Colonel Rob Levinson (ph), who is my Hill representative from the Washington field office. And I'll turn it over to General Schmidt.

SCHMIDT: Sir, I'd like to start with General Furlow. He and four members spent two months pulling this together, doing the majority -- the vast majority of the interviews. When I came in, it was because there were some general officers to interview. And eventually we got to seven of those. John, go ahead and introduce your original team.

FURLOW: Sir, in addition to myself, there was Colonel Alex Crother (ph), who's not here today; Sergeant Major Beverly James (ph), who's also not here today. Who is here today is Captain Harvey "Chip" Jarvis (ph), right back here. Thanks.

WARNER: Thank you very much.

SCHMIDT: The team I brought, I drafted my command staff judge advocate, Colonel Joe Himan (ph), and he now works for Chairman's Legal, and we have borrowed him and he has put in yeoman work on this. My commander action group chief, Lieutenant Colonel Danny Wolf (ph) has done great work. He typed past midnight last night making these slides to put this together. My executive officer, Scott Serone (ph), now, is off doing personnel duty. He's an A-10 fighter pilot. And this, again, this is not our day job. And he did great work. And the logistics was pulled together by my aide, Captain Hector Lopez (ph) -- everything from getting our airlift to the paper -- sending the things over here -- to getting us sandwiches with extra jalapenos, because we miss those from Arizona. They did yeoman work. The team worked together to step in for one month of a three-month investigation. John Furlow did an absolutely outstanding job. WARNER: And I thank all of you very much. We've had an excellent hearing. I felt it very important for this committee to have direct access to each of you in the context of a hearing, which we've had today, to be subjected to such cross-examine and expressions of viewpoints as the members may wish to make. And, indeed, that did take place. Thank you very much. We'll now go to 222.

END

NOTES: [????] - Indicates Speaker Unknown [--] - Indicates could not make out what was being said.[off mike] - Indicates could not make out what was being said. PERSON: JOHN MCCAIN (91%); SAXBY CHAMBLISS (57%); SAXBY CHAMBLISS (57%); ELIZABETH DOLE (56%); ELIZABETH DOLE (56%); ROBERT BYRD (55%); HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (54%); EVAN BAYH (54%); HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (54%); LOAD-DATE: July 18, 2005 Document 16


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