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Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib (The Fay-Jones Investigation), August 23, 2004

On May 31, 2004, LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) appointed MG George R. Fay to investigate allegations that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (205 MI BDE) were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison. On June 24, 2004 General Paul J. Kern, then Procedure 15 Appointing Authority, appointed LTG Anthony R. Jones to investigate whether personnel, organizations, events, or circumstances other than 205 MI BDE were involved in the alleged (sic) detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. Generals Fay and Jones produced separate AR 15-6 investigations (and will be referred to below as "The Jones Investigation" and "The Fay Investigation"). Yet, they have been joined under the title "Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib" (or, more simply, as "The Fay-Jones Investigation"). The executive summary of this joint report was dated August 23, 2004.

Although the Fay-Jones Investigation deals with abuse at Abu Ghraib, it provides testimony of prisoner abuse at Guantánam, specifically regarding the use of sleep deprivation and nudity in interrogations. CSHRA has lifted this testimony from this investigation and reproduced it below.


Sexual Abuse


(FJ4) The use of nudity as an interrogation technique or incentive to maintain the cooperation of detainees was not a technique developed at Abu Ghraib, but rather a technique which was imported and can be traced through Afghanistan and GTMO. As interrogation operations in Iraq began to take form, it was often the same personnel who had operated and deployed in other theaters and in support of GWOT, who were called upon to establish and conduct interrogation operations in Abu Ghraib. The lines of authority and the prior legal opinions blurred. They simply carried forward the use of nudity into the Iraqi theater of operations. The use of clothing as an incentive (nudity) is significant in that it likely contributed to an escalating “de-humanization” of the detainees and set the stage for additional and more severe abuses to occur (The Fay Investigation, p. 10).

(FJ5) When asked, SOLDIER-03 recalled hearing about nakedness at GTMO, but never employed the technique (The Fay Investigation, p. 61).

(FJ7) Incidents of Detainee Abuse Using Humiliation. Removal of clothing was not a technique developed at Abu Ghraib, but rather a technique which was imported and can be traced through Afghanistan and GTMO […] The removal of clothing for both MI and MP objectives was authorized, approved, and employed in Afghanistan and GTMO (The Fay Investigation, pp. 87f).


Psychological Abuse


(FJ6) Sleep adjustment was brought with the 519 MI BN from Afghanistan. It is also a method used at GTMO (The Fay Investigation, p. 70).


Unspecified Abuse


(FJ1) No single, or simple, cause explains why some of the Abu Ghraib abuses happened. In addition to the leadership failings discussed above, other contributing factors include […] [s]oldier knowledge of interrogation techniques permitted in GTMO and Afghanistan and failure to distinguish between those environments and Iraq (The Jones Investigation, p. 18).

(FJ2) I find that a number of causes outside of the control of CJTF-7 also contributed to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. These […] include, individuals’ criminal propensity; Soldier knowledge of interrogation techniques permitted in GTMO and Afghanistan and failure to distinguish between those environments and Iraq (The Jones Investigation, p. 24).

(FJ3) Inadequacy of doctrine for detention operations and interrogation operations was a contributing factor to the situations that occurred at Abu Ghraib. The Army’s capstone doctrine for the conduct of interrogation operations is Field Manual (FM) 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, dated September 1992. Non-doctrinal approaches, techniques, and practices were developed and approved for use in Afghanistan and GTMO as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These techniques, approaches, and practices became confused at Abu Ghraib and were implemented without proper authorities or safeguards. Soldiers were not trained on non-doctrinal interrogation techniques such as sleep adjustment, isolation, and the use of dogs. Many interrogators and personnel overseeing interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib had prior exposure to or experience in GTMO or Afghanistan. Concepts for the non-doctrinal, non field-manual approaches and practices came from documents and personnel in GTMO and Afghanistan (The Fay Investigation, p. 8).

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