IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ALLAH MUHAMMED SALEEM,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH, et al.,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 05-0833 (JR)

DECLARATION OF TERESA A. McPALMER

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Commander Teresa A. McPalmer, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, United States Navy, hereby state that to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, the following is true, accurate and correct:

1. I am the Legal Advisor to the Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (OARDEC). In that capacity I am an advisor to the Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals.

2. I hereby certify that the documents attached hereto constitute a true and accurate copy of the portions of the record of proceedings before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal related to petitioner Allah Muhammed Saleem that are suitable for public release. The portions of the record that are classified or considered law enforcement-sensitive are not attached hereto or were redacted by an OARDEC staff member. This staff member also redacted information that would personally identify certain U.S. Government personnel in order to protect the personal privacy and security of those individuals.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: 12 November 2005

Teresa A. McPalmer
CDR, JAGC, U. S. Navy

3733
Department of Defense
Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals

OARDEC/Ser: 7031

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From: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Subj: REVIEW OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN #716

Ref: (a) Deputy Secretary of Defense Order of 7 July 2004
     (b) Secretary of the Navy Order of 29 July 2004

1. The Combatant Status Review Tribunal's determination that Detainee ISN #716 shall no longer be classified as an enemy combatant is approved.

2. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the written report of the Tribunal's decision will be forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy.

J. M. McGARRAH
RADM, CEC, USN

Distribution:
NSC (Mr. John B. Wiegmann)
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UNCLASSIFIED

3 Feb 05

MEMORANDUM

From: Legal Advisor
To: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Subj: LEGAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN #716

Ref: (a) Deputy Secretary of Defense Order of 7 July 2004
(b) Secretary of the Navy Implementation Directive of 29 July 2004

Encl: (1) Appointing Order for Tribunal #30 of 7 January 2005
(2) Record of Tribunal Proceedings

1. A legal sufficiency review has been completed on the subject Combatant Status Review Tribunal in accordance with references (a) and (b). After reviewing the record of the Tribunal, I find that:

   a. The detainee was properly notified of the Tribunal process, affirmatively declined to participate in the Tribunal. See exhibit D-a

   b. The Tribunal was properly convened and constituted by enclosure (1).

   c. The Tribunal substantially complied with the provisions of references (a) and (b).

   d. The detainee did not request that any witnesses or evidence be produced on his behalf.

   e. The Tribunal’s decision that detainee #716 shall no longer be classified as an enemy combatant was by a vote of 2-1. The dissenting Tribunal member’s report is attached to the Tribunal Decision Report as enclosure (3).

   f. The detainee’s Personal Representative was given the opportunity to review the record of proceedings and did not submit comments to the Tribunal. See enclosure (6)

2. The proceedings and decision of the Tribunal are legally sufficient and no corrective action is required.

3. I recommend that the decision of the Tribunal be approved and the record of proceedings be forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy in accordance with reference (b).

   PETER C. BRADFORD
   LT, JAGC, USNR
Department of Defense
Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals

7 Jan 05

From: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals

Subj: APPOINTMENT OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL #30

Ref: (a) Convening Authority Appointment Letter of 9 July 2004

By the authority given to me in reference (a), a Combatant Status Review Tribunal established by "Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba" dated 29 July 2004 is hereby convened. It shall hear such cases as shall be brought before it without further action of referral or otherwise.

The following commissioned officers shall serve as members of the Tribunal:

MEMBERS:

[Redacted], Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve; President

[Redacted], Commander, U.S. Navy; Member (JAG)

[Redacted], Major, U.S. Air Force; Member

J. M. McGARRAH
Rear Admiral
Civil Engineer Corps
United States Navy

3736
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CSRT

FROM: OARDEC FORWARD Commander ICO ISN 716


2. If there are any questions regarding this package, point of contact on this matter is the undersigned at DSN [redacted].

CAPT, USN
(U) Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report Cover Sheet

(U) This Document is UNCLASSIFIED Upon Removal of Enclosures (2), (3) and (5).

(U) TRIBUNAL PANEL: ___#30___

(U) ISN#: ___716___

Ref:  (a) (U) Convening Order for Tribunal #30 of 7 January 2005 (U)
     (b) (U) CSRT Implementation Directive of 29 July 2004 (U)
     (c) (U) DEPSECDEF Memo of 7 July 2004 (U)

Encl:  (1) (U) Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision (U//FOUO)
       (2) (U) Classified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision (S//NF)
       (3) (U) Dissenting Tribunal Member’s Report (S//NF)
       (4) (U) Personal Representative’s Statement (U//FOUO)
       (5) (U) Copies of Documentary Evidence Presented (S//NF)
       (6) (U) Personal Representative’s Record Review (U//FOUO)

1. (U) This Tribunal was convened by references (a) and (b) to make a determination as to whether the Detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant as defined in reference (c).

2. (U) On 13 January 2005, the Tribunal determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Detainee #716 shall no longer be classified as an enemy combatant as defined in reference (c).

3. (U) Enclosure (1) provides an unclassified account of the basis for the Tribunal’s decision. A detailed account of the evidence considered by the Tribunal and its findings of fact are contained in enclosures (1) and (2).

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Tribunal President
UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF BASIS FOR TRIBUNAL DECISION

(Enclosure (1) to Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report)

TRIBUNAL PANEL: #30
ISN #: 716

1. Introduction

As the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Decision Report indicates, the Tribunal has determined that this detainee shall no longer be classified as an enemy combatant as defined in the DEPSECDEF Memo of 7 July 2004. In reaching its conclusions, the Tribunal considered both classified and unclassified information. The following is an account of the unclassified evidence considered by the Tribunal and other pertinent information. Classified evidence considered by the Tribunal is discussed in Enclosure (2) to the CSRT Decision Report.

2. Synopsis of Proceedings

The Tribunal hearing was conducted on 13 January 2005. During the unclassified portion of the Tribunal, the Personal Representative presented Exhibit D-a, the Detainee Election Form. The Recorder then presented Exhibits R-1 and R-2. The former exhibit, the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, indicates that: the Detainee is associated with al Qaida; the Detainee has been living under an alias while in detention and is in fact, a fairly significant member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and al Qaida; EIJ is an extremist group that merged with al Qaida; in 1998, Doctor Ayman Al-Zawahiri merged EIJ into al Qaida, in effect making all EIJ members al Qaida members; the Detainee worked for a Bayt al Ansar safehouse in Peshawar, Pakistan; Bayt al Ansar refers to safehouses used to organize volunteers for Jihad; the Bayt al Anser guesthouse served as a staging area for Mujahadeen on their way in and out of Afghanistan (AF); the Detainee set a pattern of traveling between Peshwar and Jalalabad, staying at Libyan guesthouses; the Detainee was captured with an admitted supporter of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG); LIFG is an extremist group with members aligned with al Qaida organization or active in the international Mujahadeen network; the Detainee was an employee of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO); the IIRO is a large Jeddah-based humanitarian aid organization that performs relief work worldwide, but also is used by Islamic terrorists and insurgents for cover, travel, and funding; the Detainee was a bodyguard for Usama Bin Ladin; the Detainee is prominent in the Usama Bin Ladin and Egyptian Islamic Jihad circles; and the Detainee was apprehended during the “Greentown” raids on 3 April 2002, in Lahore, Pakistan. The Recorder called no witnesses.

The Detainee did not attend the Tribunal and affirmatively declined to participate in the Tribunal process. His decision is reflected on the Detainee Election Form (Exhibit D-a). The Personal Representative presented brief comments on the Detainee’s behalf. Those comments are provided in Enclosure (4) to the CSRT Decision Report. The Detainee requested no witnesses or other evidence.
During the classified session of the Tribunal, the Recorder presented Exhibits R-3 through R-17, without comment. The Personal Representative introduced no classified documents and did not comment on the classified evidence.

3. Evidence Considered by the Tribunal

The Tribunal considered the following evidence in reaching its conclusions:

a. Exhibits: D-a and R-1 through R-17.

b. Testimony of the following persons: None.

c. Sworn testimony of the Detainee: None, but see Enclosure (4) to the CSRT Decision Report for brief comments made on the Detainee’s behalf by the Personal Representative.

4. Rulings by the Tribunal on Detainee Requests for Evidence or Witnesses

The Detainee requested no witnesses or other evidence be produced for the hearing; no rulings were necessary.

5. Discussion of Unclassified Evidence

The Tribunal considered the following unclassified evidence in making its determinations:

a. The recorder offered Exhibits R-1 and R-2 into evidence during the unclassified portion of the proceeding. Exhibit R-1, the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, while helpful in that it provides a broad outline of what the Tribunal can expect to see, is not persuasive in that it provides conclusory statements without supporting unclassified evidence. Exhibit R-2, an excerpt from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, contains some information that appears to be related to the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, but which did not relate directly to the Detainee. Accordingly, the Tribunal had to look to the classified exhibits for support for the Unclassified Summary of Evidence.

b. Essentially the only unclassified evidence the Tribunal had to consider was the brief statement of the Personal Representative, in which the Detainee denied the allegations, calling them lies. The Personal Representative’s comments are provided in Enclosure (4) to the CSRT Decision Report.

The Tribunal also relied on certain classified evidence in reaching its decision. A discussion of the classified evidence is found in Enclosure (2) to the CSRT Decision Report.

6. Consultations with the CSRT Legal Advisor

No issues arose during the course of this hearing that required consultation with the CSRT legal advisor.
7. Conclusions of the Tribunal

Upon careful review of all the evidence presented in this matter, the Tribunal makes the following determinations:

a. No evidence was produced that caused the Tribunal to question whether the Detainee was mentally and physically capable of participating in the proceeding, had he wanted to do so. Accordingly, no medical or mental health evaluation was requested or deemed necessary.

b. As indicated in Exhibit D-a, the Detainee made a conscious decision not to attend his Tribunal. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds the Detainee made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision not to participate in the Tribunal process.

c. That this detainee shall no longer be classified as an enemy combatant as defined in the DEPSECDEF Memo of 7 July 2004.

8. Dissenting Tribunal Member's Report

The Tribunal reached a 2-1 decision. See enclosure (3) for the Dissenting Member's report.

Respectfully submitted,

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Tribunal President
IN ABSENTIA

The Tribunal President read the Hearing Instructions.

The Tribunal President confirmed the Detainee elected not to participate in the Tribunal process.

Tribunal President: I note for the record that the detainee whose case in hearing is not present at this hearing room. Personal Representative you have advised the Tribunal that Ala Abd Al Maqsut Muhammad Sagim Mazruh has elected not to participate in this Tribunal. Is that still the situation?

Personal Representative: Yes sir.

Tribunal President: Personal Representative, did you meet with the detainee and inform him of his rights in regards to this proceeding?

Personal Representative: Yes sir, I did.

Tribunal President: Did he appear to understand the process?

Personal Representative: Yes sir.

Tribunal President: Was the Unclassified Summary of Evidence read to the detainee?

Personal Representative: Yes sir.

Tribunal President: Was a translator used during your interview?

Personal Representative: Yes sir.

Tribunal President: Did you confirm that the translator spoke the same language as the detainee?

Personal Representative: Yes sir.
The Personal Representative presented the Detainee Election Form (Exhibit D-A) to the Tribunal.

The Tribunal President, referring to the Detainee Election Form, made the following statement:

Tribunal President: As I make reference to the Detainee Election Form, it’s noted that the detainee chose not to be present at this hearing. Is that correct?

Personal Representative: Yes sir.

Tribunal President: How did he indicate that choice?

Personal Representative: He told me through the translator prior to the interview that he did not want to participate and at the end of the interview he repeated it.

Tribunal President: Very well then. At this time the Tribunal proceeding will continue in the detainee’s absence.

The Recorder presented the Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Exhibit R-1) to the Tribunal.

The Recorder presented Exhibits R-2 into evidence and gave a brief description of the contents of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Exhibit R-1).

3.a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida:

3.a.1. The detainee has been living under an alias while in detention and is in fact, a fairly significant member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and al Qaida.

3.a.2. EIJ is an extremist group that merged with al Qaida.

3.a.3. In 1998, Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri merged EIJ into al Qaida, in effect making all EIJ members al Qaida members.

3.a.4. The detainee worked for a Bayt al Ansar safehouse in Peshawar, Pakistan (PK).

3.a.5. Bayt al Ansar refers to a Safehouses used to organize volunteers for jihad.

3.a.6. The Bayt al Ansar guesthouse served as a staging area for Mujahadeen on their way in and out of Afghanistan (AF).

3.a.7. The detainee set a pattern of traveling between Peshawar and Jalalabad staying at Libyan guesthouses.

3.a.8. The detainee was captured with an admitted supporter of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).
3.a.9. LIFG is an extremist group with members aligned with the al Qaida organization or active in the international Mujahadeen network.

3.a.10. The detainee was an employee of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO).

3.a.11. IIRO is a large Jeddah-based humanitarian aid organization that performs relief work worldwide, but also is used by Islamic terrorist and insurgents for cover, travel and funding.

3.a.12. The detainee was a bodyguard for Usama Bin Ladin.

3.a.13. The detainee is prominent in the Usama Bin Ladin and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad circles.

3.a.14. The detainee was apprehended during the “Greentown” raids on 3 April 2002, in Lahore, Pakistan.

The Recorder confirmed that he had no further unclassified evidence or witnesses and requested a closed Tribunal session to present classified evidence.

The Tribunal President opened the Tribunal to the Personal Representative to present the Detainee’s statement.

Personal Representative: When I asked if he had anything to impart to the Tribunal he merely indicated that he was innocent and all of this is not true.

Tribunal President: Is there anything else?

Personal Representative: No sir.

The Tribunal President confirmed with the Personal Representative that he has further evidence to submit during the unclassified portion of the Tribunal and that the Detainee had no previously approved witnesses to present to the Tribunal.

The Tribunal President adjourned the open session.

AUTHENTICATION

I certify the material contained in this transcript is a true and accurate summary of the testimony given during the proceedings.

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Tribunal President
DETAINEE ELECTION FORM

Date: 12 JAN 05
Start Time: 1030
End Time: 1105

ISN#: 716

Personal Representative: [Name redacted] LTC, US ARMY

Translator Required? YES Language? ARABIC

CSRT Procedure Read to Detainee or Written Copy Read by Detainee? YES

Detainee Election:

☐ Wants to Participate in Tribunal
☒ Affirmatively Declines to Participate in Tribunal
☐ Uncooperative or Unresponsive

Personal Representative Comments:

Detainee affirmatively declined to participate before and after the reading of the CSRT script and the unclassified summary.
UNCLASSIFIED

Combatant Status Review Board

TO: Tribunal Member

FROM: OIC, CSRT (7 January 2005)

Subject: Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal – MAZRUH, Ala Abd Al Maqsut Muhammad Sagim

1. Under the provisions of the Secretary of the Navy Memorandum, dated 29 July 2004, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base Cuba, a Tribunal has been appointed to review the detainee’s designation as an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The United States Government has previously determined that the detainee is an enemy combatant. This determination is based on information possessed by the United States that indicates that the detainee is associated with al Qaida.

   a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida:

      1. The detainee has been living under an alias while in detention and is in fact, a fairly significant member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and al Qaida.

      2. EIJ is an extremist group that merged with al Qaida.

      3. In 1998, Doctor Ayman Al-Zawahiri merged EIJ into al Qaida, in effect making all EIJ members al Qaida members.

      4. The detainee worked for a Bayt al Ansar safehouse in Peshawar, Pakistan (PK).

      5. Bayt al Ansar refers to safehouses used to organize volunteers for Jihad.

      6. The Bayt al Anser guesthouse served as a staging area for Mujahadeen on their way in and out of Afghanistan (AF).

      7. The detainee set a pattern of traveling between Peshwar and Jalalabad, staying at Libyan guesthouses.

      8. The detainee was captured with an admitted supporter of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).
9. LIFG is an extremist group with members aligned with al Qaida organization or active in the international Mujahadeen network.

10. The detainee was an employee of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO).

11. The IIRO is a large Jeddah-based humanitarian aid organization that performs relief work worldwide, but also is used by Islamic terrorists and insurgents for cover, travel, and funding.

12. The detainee was a bodyguard for Usama Bin Ladin.

13. The detainee is prominent in the Usama Bin Ladin and Egyptian Islamic Jihad circles.

14. The detainee was apprehended during the “Greentown” raids on 3 April 2002, in Lahore, Pakistan.

4. (U) The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability of evidence or witnesses.
Terrorist Organization Reference Guide
U. S. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

Purpose: The purpose of the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide is to provide the Field with a who's who in terrorism. The main players and organizations are identified so the CBP Officer and BP Agent can associate what terror groups are from what countries, in order to better screen and identify potential terrorists.

Limitations (Gaps in Data): This Guide is based upon the information available to this office at the time that the report was prepared.

NOTE: This report is based upon information obtained from various open sources. No classified information was used in the preparation of this report.

For corrections, amendments, and suggestions, notify:

Office of Border Patrol  
Bldg. 11624 SSG Sims Road,  
Biggs AAF,  
El Paso, TX 79908  
Mailing Address: Attn. BPSCC P.O. Box 6017  
El Paso, Texas 79906  
POC Kent D. Thew  
Tel: (915) 724-3218
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Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

The following descriptive list constitutes the 36 terrorist groups that currently (as of 30 January 2003) are designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The designations carry legal consequences:

- It is unlawful to provide funds or other material support to a designated FTO.
- Representatives and certain members of a designated FTO can be denied visas or excluded from the United States.
- US financial institutions must block funds of designated FTOs and their agents and must report the blockage to the US Department of the Treasury.

1. Abu Nidal organization (ANO)

a.k.a. Fatah - the Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

Description

Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in July 1988. Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. Has not staged a major attack against Western targets since the late 1980s.

Strength

Few hundred plus limited overseas support structure.

Location/Area of Operation

Elements relocated to Iraq in December 1998, where the group maintains a presence. Has an operational presence in Lebanon including in several Palestinian refugee camps. Authorities shut down the ANO's operations in Libya and Egypt in 1999. Has demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Financial problems and internal disorganization have reduced the group's activities and capabilities.
External Aid

Has received considerable support, including safehaven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations.

2. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Description

The ASG is the most violent of the separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Some ASG leaders allegedly fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet war and are students and proponents of radical Islamic teachings. The group split from the Moro National Liberation Front in the early 1990s under the leadership of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. His younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, has replaced him as the nominal leader of the group, which is composed of several semiautonomous factions.

Activities

Engages in kidnappings for ransom, bombings, assassinations, and extortion. Although from time to time it claims that its motivation is to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims, the ASG has primarily used terror for financial profit. Recent bombings may herald a return to a more radical, politicized agenda. The group's first large-scale action was a raid on the town of Ipi in Mindanao in April 1995. In April of 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 persons, including 10 foreign tourists, from a resort in Malaysia. Separately in 2000, the group abducted several foreign journalists, three Malaysians, and a US citizen. On 27 May 2001, the ASG kidnapped three US citizens and 17 Filipinos from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including one US citizen, were murdered. During a Philippine military hostage rescue operation on 7 June 2002, US hostage Gracia Burnham was rescued, but US hostage Martin Burnham and Filipina Deborah Yap were killed during the operation. Philippine authorities say that the ASG had a role in the bombing near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga on 2 October that killed three Filipinos and one US serviceman and wounded 20 others.

Strength

Estimated to have 200 to 500 members.

Location/Area of Operation

The ASG was founded in Basilan Province and mainly operates there and in the neighboring provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago. It also operates
in the Zamboanga peninsula, and members occasionally travel to Manila and other parts of the country. The group expanded its operations to Malaysia in 2000 when it abducted foreigners from a tourist resort.

**External Aid**

Largely self-financing through ransom and extortion; may receive support from Islamic extremists in the Middle East and South Asia. Libya publicly paid millions of dollars for the release of the foreign hostages seized from Malaysia in 2000.

3. **Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (al-Aqsa)**

**Description**

The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade comprises an unknown number of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists that emerged at the outset of the current intifadah to attack Israeli targets. It aims to drive the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem and to establish a Palestinian state.

**Activities**

Al-Aqsa has carried out shootings and suicide operations against Israeli military personnel and civilians and has killed Palestinians who it believed were collaborating with Israel. At least five US citizens, four of them dual Israeli-US citizens, were killed in al-Aqsa's attacks. The group probably did not attack them because of their US citizenship. In January 2002, al-Aqsa claimed responsibility for the first suicide bombing carried out by a female.

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Al-Aqsa operates mainly in the West Bank and has claimed attacks inside Israel and the Gaza Strip. It may have followers in Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon.

**External Aid**

Unknown.
4. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

Description

An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The GIA began its violent activity in 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front - the largest Islamic opposition party - in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991.

Activities

Frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. Since 1992, the GIA has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation, although the group's dwindling numbers have caused a decrease in the number of attacks. Since announcing its campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and women - mostly Europeans - in the country. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. The GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994. In 2002, a French court sentenced two GIA members to life in prison for conducting a series of bombings in France in 1995.

Strength

Precise numbers unknown, probably fewer than 100.

Location/Area of Operation

Algeria.

External Aid

None known.

5. 'Asbat al-Ansar

Description

'Asbat al-Ansar - the League of the Followers - is a Lebanon-based, Sunni extremist group, composed primarily of Palestinians and associated with Usama Bin Ladin. The group follows an extremist interpretation of Islam that justifies violence against civilian targets to achieve political ends. Some of those goals include overthrowing the Lebanese Government and thwarting perceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in the country.
16. **Al-Jihad**

a.k.a. **Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad**

**Description**

Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the late 1970s. Merged with Bin Ladin's al-Qaeda organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. Primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack US and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.

**Activities**

Historically specialized in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian Government personnel, including cabinet ministers, and car bombings against official US and Egyptian facilities. The original Jihad was responsible for the assassination in 1981 of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Claimed responsibility for the attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since 1993 and has never targeted foreign tourists there. Responsible for Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad in 1995; in 1998 an attack against US Embassy in Albania was thwarted.

**Strength**

Unknown, but probably has several hundred hard-core members.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Historically operated in the Cairo area, but most of its network is outside Egypt, including Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom, and its activities have been centered outside Egypt for several years.

**External Aid**

Unknown. The Egyptian Government claims that Iran supports the Jihad. Its merger with al-Qaeda also boosts Bin Ladin's support for the group. Also may obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental organizations, cover businesses, and criminal acts.
including US citizens. Several of the arrested militants have reportedly undergone military training in Afghanistan, and some fought with the Afghan mujahidin during the war against the former Soviet Union. Others are alleged to have ties to Islamic extremist organizations in Indonesia and the Philippines.

Strength

Malaysian police assess the KMM to have 70 to 80 members. The Malaysian police continued to investigate more than 200 suspected Muslim militants throughout 2002.

Location/Area of Operation

The KMM is reported to have networks in the Malaysian states of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, and Kelantan. They also operate in Wilayah Persukutuan, the federal territory comprising Kuala Lumpur. According to press reports, the KMM has ties to radical Indonesian Islamic groups and has sent members to Ambon, Indonesia, to fight against Christians.

External Aid

Largely unknown, probably self-financing.

59. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

a.k.a. Al-Jam'a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah, Fighting Islamic Group, Libyan Fighting Group, Libyan Islamic Group

Description

Emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Declared the government of Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaeda organization or are active in the international mujahedin network. The group was designated for asset freeze under E.O. 13224 and UNSCR 1333 in September 2001.

Activities

Claimed responsibility for a failed assassination attempt against Qadhafi in 1996 and engaged Libyan security forces in armed clashes during the mid-to-late 1990s. Continues to target Libyan interests and may engage in sporadic clashes with Libyan security forces.

Strength

Not known, but probably has several hundred active members or supporters.
Location/Area of Operation

Probably maintains a clandestine presence in Libya, but since late 1990s, many members have fled to various Middle Eastern and European countries.

External Aid

Not known. May obtain some funding through private donations, various Islamic nongovernmental organizations, and criminal acts.

60. Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

Description

Founded in 1989 as the successor to the Holy Spirit Movement, the LRA seeks to overthrow the Ugandan Government and replace it with a regime that will implement the group's brand of Christianity.

Activities

Since the early 1990's, the LRA has kidnapped and killed local Ugandan civilians in order to discourage foreign investment, precipitate a crisis in Uganda, and replenish their ranks.

Strength

Estimated 1,000.

Location/Area of Operation

Northern Uganda and southern Sudan.

External Aid

While the LRA has been supported by the Government of Sudan in the past, the Sudanese are now cooperating with the Government of Uganda in a campaign to eliminate LRA sanctuaries in Sudan.

61. Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)

Description

An extreme loyalist group formed in 1996 as a faction of the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) but did not emerge publicly until 1997. Composed largely of UVF
End Notes


5 Ibid., 35.


8 Ibid., 35.

9 Ibid., 36.

10 Ibid., 36.

11 Ibid., 36.

12 Ibid., 37.

13 Ibid., 37.

14 Ibid., 38.

15 Ibid., 40.

16 Ibid., 40.

17 Ibid., 38.

18 Ibid., 39.

19 Ibid., 39.

20 Ibid., 40.
Personal Representative Review of the Record of Proceedings

I acknowledge that on 18 January 2005 I was provided the opportunity to review the record of proceedings for the Combatant Status Review Tribunal involving ISN #716.

✓ I have no comments.

___ My comments are attached.

[Blacked out] USA

[Blacked out] Name

[Blacked out] Signature

18 Jan 05

Date